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ABSTRACT
Machine learning models trained on data from multiple demographic groups can inherit representation
disparity [1] that may exist in the data: the group contributing less to the training process may suffer
higher loss in model accuracy; this in turn can degrade population retention in these groups over
time in terms of their contribution to the training process of future models, which then exacerbates
representation disparity in the long run. In this study, we seek to understand the interplay between
the model accuracy and the underlying group representation and how they evolve in a sequential
decision setting over an infinite horizon, and how the use of fair machine learning plays a role in this
process. Using a simple user dynamics (arrival and departure) model, we characterize the long-term
property of using machine learning models under a set of fairness criteria imposed on each stage of
the decision process, including the commonly used statistical parity and equal opportunity fairness.
We show that under this particular arrival/departure model, both these criteria cause the representation
disparity to worsen over time, resulting in groups diminishing entirely from the sample pool, while
the criterion of equalized loss fares much better. Our results serve to highlight the fact that fairness
cannot be defined outside the larger feedback loop where past actions taken by users (who are either
subject to the decisions made by the algorithm or whose data are used to train the algorithm or both)
will determine future observations and decisions.
1 Introduction
Most of modern machine learning techniques are developed to capture features of the data sampled from a underlying
population in the training process, e.g., by minimizing overall loss over the training dataset. The premise that the data is
truly representative of the underlying population [2], however, is generally incorrect, and the training dataset may lead
to inaccurate machine learning models for a number of reasons such as the following.
• Bias in data samples: Certain groups (e.g., a majority group within a population) may have a (disproportion-
ately) higher representation in the training data as compared to the other groups (e.g., a minority group). The
resulting machine learning models could be biased in favor of the groups having more representation in the
training dataset to the detriment of the minority group. For instance, speech recognition products recognize
native speakers much better than non-native speakers [3].
• Incomplete data: It is possible that some features, which are critical to training the model, are difficult to
acquire due to privacy concerns; this results in the use of sensitive/group attributes as proxies in the training
which can lead to discrimination. For instance, individuals may not be willing to share personal information
[4], and group attributes such as race, gender, etc. are then used as proxies.
∗Equal Contribution
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
00
56
9v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
 M
ay
 20
19
When machine learning algorithms inform decision making, such inaccuracies can lead to inferior and/or unfair
decisions. In particular, the standard objective of minimizing overall loss allows the resulting algorithms to inherit the
bias that existed in the training data, leading to high loss (and unfair decisions) for certain groups, often referred to as
disadvantaged group(s)/ minority group(s); this can happen in various applications, see e.g., [5, 6, 7].
Moreover, the problem does not merely stop here. Often times, decisions informed by machine learning algorithms
inevitably affect future data samples, which will be collected and used to train future generations of machine learning
algorithms. This closed, feedback loop becomes self-reinforcing and can lead to highly undesirable outcomes over time.
A prime example is the use of credit history in lending practices. Lending models are trained using credit history (data
samples), typically consisting of debt (e.g., credit card and loan) payment information. Individuals with no or short
credit history are more likely to be assigned low credit ratings and as a result disqualify for a loan (decision). However,
a loan rejection denies the individual the opportunity to improve his/her credit history (future data samples) and can
lead to future rejections (perpetuation of the negative outcome), a phenomenon known as the data collection circular
dependency.
To address the various fairness issues highlighted above, researchers have studied two categories of approaches. The
first focused on improving data pre-processing [8, 9]. For instance, Calders et al. showed that by removing certain
features, label modification, reweighing, and sampling, one can improve the fairness of the trained classifier, while
Kamiran et al. proposed a method to determine a randomized mapping to transform the original dataset into a new
dataset, which, when used to train a classifier, can mitigate the discrimination issue.
The second approach centers on imposing fairness constraints, in addition to minimizing loss, when training an
algorithm, as a way to battle biased outcomes. A variety of fairness notions have been proposed in the literature [10];
some of these can be conflicting [11]. We review some of the most relevant studies below.
Equalized odds and equal opportunity are two criteria proposed in [12], in the context of a lending decision problem;
it showed that these constraints make the outcome fairer for difference races without necessarily hurting the lender’s
profit. Liu et al. [13] considered statistical parity and equal opportunity, and showed that when the likelihood of default
and its impact on a borrower’s future credit is factored in, these fairness criteria may not improve the utility of the
minority group and may only work under certain conditions. Both [12, 13] are based on a one-shot formulation, while
Hashimoto et al. [1] considered a sequential decision formulation where individuals/users (of the machine learning
algorithm) may choose to leave the system based on the loss/error rate they experience. To prevent this attrition, this
study adopted the objective of minimizing the loss of the group with the highest loss (instead of overall or average loss);
it showed that this protection of the minority group can lead to a more equitable equilibrium.
In the present study, we are interested in the impact of fairness criteria on the group representation in a sequential
decision framework. We adopt a simple user dynamics (arrival and departure) model same as that proposed by [1].
However, instead of minimizing loss for the most disadvantaged group, we take the objective of minimizing the average
total loss over an infinite horizon subject to an instantaneous fairness criterion (imposed and satisfied at each time step
of the problem).
The goal is to understand the interplay between the model accuracy and the underlying group representation, how they
evolve in a sequential setting over the long run, and how imposing fairness criterion plays a role in this process.
Toward this end, we first characterize the long-term properties induced by the use of a set of fairness criteria in the
decision process, including statistical parity (StatPar) and equal opportunity (EqOpt). We show that under this
particular dynamic model, both criteria can worsen the representation disparity over time, resulting in the disadvantaged
group diminishing entirely from the sample pool. By contrast, the criterion of equalized loss (EqLos) is shown to be
able to sustain stable group representation over time under this dynamics. Furthermore, greedy decisions in each stage
subject to the equalized loss fairness criterion is shown to be optimal for the infinite horizon loss objective.
It is worth noting that equalized loss has been considered in an online learning setting [14] where data arrives sequentially
and the learner wants to find the best predictor among a given set, but the predictor accuracy does not affect user
participation or data arrival.
Our results also demonstrate that there can easily be a mismatch between a particular fairness definition and the
underlying factors driving the system dynamics, and that this mismatch exacerbates representation disparity in the long
run. So in essence, fairness cannot be defined in a one-shot problem setting without considering the long-run impact,
and that long-run impact cannot be properly analyzed without understanding the underlying dynamics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the problem. The analysis of sequential
problem under different fairness criteria and the equalized loss fairness are presented in Section 3. Discussions are
given in Section 4 and experiments in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2
2 Problem Formulation
Consider two demographic groups Ga and Gb, typically distinguished based on some sensitive/protected attributes
(e.g., gender, race). An individual from either group has feature X ∈ R and label Y ∈ {0, 1}. Denote by Gjk ⊂ Gk the
subgroup with label j, j ∈ {0, 1}, k ∈ {a, b}, f jk(x) its feature distribution and αjk the size of Gjk as a fraction of the
entire population. Then αk := α0k + α
1
k is the size of Gk as a fraction of the population. Denote by g
j
k = α
j
k/αk the
fraction of label j ∈ {0, 1} in group k. Thus the difference between αa and αb measures the representation disparity
between the two groups.
The distribution of X over Gk is given by fk(x) = g1kf
1
k (x) + g
0
kf
0
k (x), and the distribution over the entire population
is f(x) =
∑
k∈{a,b},j∈{0,1} α
j
kf
j
k(x).
Consider a binary classification problem based on feature X . Let hθ(x) = 1(x ≥ θ) be a decision rule parametrized
by θ ∈ R and L(y, hθ(x)) = 1(y 6= hθ(x)) the 0-1 loss. Without loss of generality, let θk, k ∈ {a, b}, be the decision
parameter for group k, with a corresponding expected loss of Lk(θk). Then the total expected loss given θa and θb is:
L(θa, θb) = αaLa(θa) + αbLb(θb) ,
where Lk(θk) = g1k
∫ θk
−∞ f
1
k (x)dx+ g
0
k
∫∞
θk
f0k (x)dx.
In practice, the distributions f jk(x) are not directly observable, and the loss expressed above is either approximated
or empirically estimated, e.g., from training or testing datasets. Note that if feature distributions of the two groups
are identical, then a single parameter value θa = θb = θ suffices. However, as discussed earlier, bias in the training
often originates from using (or being limited to using) feature X that has different distribution over different groups;
subsequently the notion of fairness often hinges on applying different decisions rules for different groups. We will
assume the two groups have different distributions: fa 6= fb.
Within this context, the fair machine learning problem commonly studied in the literature is the one-shot decision
problem stated as follows; this type of formulation has been used in a variety of applications, such as lending [15] and
hiring [16], etc.
Definition 1. (One-shot problem)
min
θa,θb
L(θa, θb) (?)
s.t. ΓC(θa, θb) = 0 ,
where ΓC(θa, θb) = 0 denotes a given fairness constraint.
The resulting solution (or decision) will be referred to as the one-shot fair decision or the greedy fair decision for a
given ΓC , as the optimality only holds for a single time step.
In this paper we will study four types of fairness criteria ΓC , including some very commonly used. These are described
as follows and illustrated in Figure 1.
1. Simple fair (Simple): ΓC = θa − θb. Imposing this criterion simply means we ensure the same decision
parameter is used for both groups.
2. Equal opportunity (EqOpt): This requires the false positive rate (FPR) be the same for different groups (Fig.
1(c))2, i.e., Pr(hθa(X) = 1|X ∈ G0a) = Pr(hθb(X) = 1|X ∈ G0b). This is equivalent to:
∫∞
θa
f0a (x)dx =∫∞
θb
f0b (x)dx. Thus the EqOpt fairness constraint can be written as:
ΓC =
∫ ∞
θa
f0a (x)dx−
∫ ∞
θb
f0b (x)dx.
3. Statistical parity (StatPar): This requires different groups be given equal probability of being labelled
1 (Fig. 1(b)), i.e., Pr(hθa(X) = 1|X ∈ Ga) = Pr(hθb(X) = 1|X ∈ Gb). This is equivalent to:∑
i∈{0,1} g
i
a
∫∞
θa
f ia(x)dx =
∑
i∈{0,1} g
i
b
∫∞
θb
f ib(x)dx. Thus the StatPar fairness constraint can be writ-
ten as:
ΓC =
∫ ∞
θa
fa(x)dx−
∫ ∞
θb
fb(x)dx.
2Depending on the context, this criterion also refers to equal false negative rate (FNR) or true positive rate (TPR) or true negative
rate (TNR), but the analysis is essentially the same.
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Figure 1: For Ga, Gb with subgroup proportions α1a = 0.55, α
0
a = 0.15, α
1
b = 0.1, α
0
b = 0.2, a pair of (θa, θb) is fair
under each criterion stated in Figure 1(b)-1(d) requires the corresponding colored areas be equal.
4. Equalized loss (EqLos): This requires that the expected loss across different groups to be equal. Thus the
EqLos constraint can be written as:
ΓC = La(θa)− Lb(θb).
Notice that for Simple, EqOpt and StatPar criteria, any (θa, θb) and (θ′a, θ
′
b) that satisfy ΓC(θa, θb) = 0 and
ΓC(θ′a, θ
′
b) = 0, θa ≥ θ′a if and only if θb ≥ θ′b.
In this study, we are interested in what happens in the long run when these fairness criteria are used in a sequential
decision setting. Specifically, if loss impacts user participation, then current loss will impact future loss. In other words,
past actions determine the system state which then determines future actions. To do so, we will study the following
constrained optimization aimed at minimizing the average total loss over an infinite horizon.
Definition 2. (Sequential problem)
min
{(θa(t),θb(t))}∞t=1
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Lt(θa(t), θb(t)) (??)
s.t. ΓC(θa(t), θb(t)) = 0, ∀t
where (θa(t), θb(t)) is the decision parameters for time step t, and the step loss:
Lt(θa(t), θb(t)) = αa(t) · La(θa(t)) + αb(t) · Lb(θb(t)).
How current decisions impact the future is driven by the following group/user retention and attrition dynamics. Denote
by Nk(t) the expected number of users from group k at time t:
Nk(t+ 1) = Nk(t) · ν(Lk(θk(t))) + βk , (1)
where ν(Lk(θk(t))) is the probability of a user from group k who was in the system at time t remaining in the
system at time t + 1, and βk is the expected number of exogenous arrivals to group k. For simplicity, here βk is
treated as a constant, but as we discuss in Section 4, our analysis and qualitative conclusions hold even when this is
given by a random process provided it is independent of the decision or current state of the system. We will model
ν(·) : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] as a strictly decreasing function to capture the fact that users are less willing to stay in the system
when subject to higher (perceived) loss. Accordingly, the relative group representation for time step t+ 1 is update as
αk(t+ 1) =
Nk(t+ 1)
Na(t+ 1) +Nb(t+ 1)
.
Dynamics model (1) suggests that user departure is driven by model accuracy, i.e., whether a classification is made
correctly (including both false negative and false positive). This applies to domains such as biometric authentication,
speaker verification, and medical diagnosis.
To find the optimal sequence (θa(t), θb(t)) and solve (??), we need to know the user arrival and departure dynamics,
i.e., observing or accurately estimating ν(·) and βk, or alternatively Nk(t), which may or may not be realistic. In the
next section we will take these quantities as known or observable and focus on understanding the long term property of
the decisions under different fairness constraints. We will discuss the case of incomplete information in Section 4.
We end this section with a few assumptions, mostly for simplicity of exposition. We will assume that the distributions
f0a (x), f
1
a (x), f
0
b (x), f
1
b (x) have bounded support on [a0, a0], [a1, a1], [b0, b0] and [b1, b1] respectively, and that f
1
k (x)
and f0k (x) overlap, i.e., a0 < a1 < a0 < a1 and b0 < b1 < b0 < b1, though this assumption does not affect our main
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results; two examples are shown in Figure 2. Our main technical assumption is stated in the following, although it is not
required in some of our results.
Assumption 1. Let Ta = [a1, a0] (resp. Tb = [b1, b0]) be the overlapping interval between f0a (x) and f1a (x) (resp.
f0b (x) and f
1
b (x)). The distribution f
1
k (x) is strictly increasing and f
0
k (x) is strictly decreasing over Tk for k ∈ {a, b}.
k0 k1 k0 k1
x
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(a) Strict monotonic over Tk
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(b) Uniformly distributed
Figure 2: Model illustration: feature distributions of Ga, Gb
For bell-shaped feature distributions (e.g., normal, Cauchy, etc.), Assumption 1 implies that f1k (x) and f
0
k (x) are
sufficiently separated. An example is shown in Fig. 2(a). The example shown in Fig. 2(b) violates the above assumption,
although this case is also amenable to analysis with similar results as we discuss in Section 4.
3 Analysis of the Sequential Problem
In this section we examine the sequential problem under different fairness criteria. We begin by solving the one-shot
problem under each of the first three fairness constraints. We then characterize what happens in the long run when
these one-shot decisions are applied in each step, i.e., using a greedy policy for the infinite horizon problem. The last
subsection studies the EqLos fairness and its long-term property.
3.1 Greedy, one-shot solutions
Below we find the solution to the one-shot optimization problem (?) for Simple, EqOpt, and StatPar fairness,
respectively.
The loss for group a can be written as
La(θa) =
∫ θa
−∞
g1af
1
a (x)dx+
∫ ∞
θa
g0af
0
a (x)dx =

∫ a0
θa
g0af
0
a (x)dx, if θa ∈ [a0, a1]∫ a0
θa
g0af
0
a (x)dx+
∫ θa
a1
g1af
1
a (x)dx, if θa ∈ [a1, a0]∫ θa
a1
g1af
1
a (x)dx, if θa ∈ [a0, a1]
,
which is decreasing in θa over [a0, a1] and increasing over [a0, a1]. We have
θ∗a = arg min
θa
La(θa) =

a1, if g
1
af
1
a (a1) ≥ g0af0a (a1)
δa, if g1af
1
a (a1) < g
0
af
0
a (a1) & g
1
af
1
a (a0) > g
0
af
0
a (a0)
a0, if g1af
1
a (a0) ≤ g0af0a (a0)
,
where δa ∈ [a1, a0] is such that dLa(x)dx |x=δa = g1af1a (δa) − g0af0a (δa) = 0. It is easy to verify that the above three
branches cover all cases under Assumption 1. For Gb, θ∗b = arg minθb Lb(θb) ∈ {b1, δb, b0} can be found similarly.
Below we will focus on the case when θ∗a = δa and θ
∗
b = δb, while noting that the results for the other cases are
essentially the same.
For Simple, StatPar and EqOpt fairness, ∃ a strictly increasing function φ, such that ΓC(φ(θb), θb) = 0. Denote
by φ−1 the inverse of φ. Without loss of generality, we will assign group labels a and b such that φ(δb) < δa and
φ−1(δa) > δb.
Lemma 1. For Simple, EqOpt and StatPar fairness constraints, the one-shot fair solution to problem (?) is given
by (θ∗a, θ
∗
b ) = arg minθa,θb L(θa, θb) ∈ {(θa, θb)|θa ∈ [φ(δb), δa], θb ∈ [δb, φ−1(δa)],ΓC(θa, θb) = 0} regardless of
group proportions (αa, αb).
Lemma 1 shows that although there may be many solutions to the optimization (?) given different group proportions,
these solutions are all bounded by the same compact intervals. The following Theorem 1 describes the conditions a
solution should satisfy.
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Theorem 1. Consider the one-shot problem (?) at some time step t, with group proportions given by αa(t), αb(t).
Under Assumption 1, let (θa(t), θb(t)) be the one-shot solution under either Simple, EqOpt or StatPar fairness at
time step t, then (θa(t), θb(t)) is unique and satisfies the following:
αa(t)
αb(t)
= ΨC(θa(t), θb(t)), (2)
where ΨC is a function increasing in θa(t) and θb(t), which is different under different fairness criterion ΓC(θa, θb) = 0.
See Lemma 3 in Appendix C for details about each ΨC . Theorem 1 illustrates the impact of
αa(t)
αb(t)
on the one-shot
solution (θa(t), θb(t)).
αa(t)
αb(t)
can be used as a measure of representation disparity, the population size of two groups are
more similar if it is closer to 1. The following Lemma further states the impact of this one-shot solution on the losses
experienced by two groups.
Lemma 2. Suppose (θa, θb) and (θ′a, θ′b) are two pairs of decisions imposed on two groups Ga, Gb which satisfy
either Simple, EqOpt or StatPar fairness. If θa ≥ θ′a and θb ≥ θ′b, then the consequent expected loss satisfy
La(θa) ≤ La(θ′a) and Lb(θb) ≥ Lb(θ′b).
Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 immediately suggest a feedback loop between one-shot decisions (θa(t), θb(t)) and the
representation disparity αa(t)αb(t) : the latter drives the former that results in certain differences in the losses experienced by
the two groups, which then effects the user retention rates in two groups and drives future representation. Next we will
characterize this feedback loop and understand the long-term property of applying this one-shot solutions.
3.2 Long-term property of applying one-shot solutions
Next we will characterize what will happen in the long run if applying the one-shot solution at each time step. The
convergence of αa(t)αb(t) and (θa(t), θb(t)) are concluded in Theorem 2 below.
Theorem 2. Let (θa(t), θb(t)) be the solution to one-shot problem (?) under either Simple, EqOpt or StatPar fairness
at time step t, with group ratios αa(t)αb(t) and expected loss La(θa(t)), Lb(θb(t)). If the initial states Na(1), Nb(1) satisfy
Na(1)
Nb(1)
= βaβb and Nk(2) > Nk(1), k ∈ {a, b}3, then the following holds under dynamics (1) and Assumption 1:
(1) If La(θa(1)) > Lb(θb(1)), then
αa(t+1)
αb(t+1)
< αa(t)αb(t) and La(θa(t + 1)) > La(θa(t)) > Lb(θb(t)) > Lb(θb(t + 1))
will hold ∀t. Moreover, θa(t+ 1) < θa(t) and θb(t+ 1) < θb(t) hold ∀t and (θa(t), θb(t)) will converge to a constant
decision (θ∞a , θ
∞
b ) as t→∞, where θa(1) > θ∞a ≥ φ(δb) and θb(1) > θ∞b ≥ δb.
(2) If La(θa(1)) < Lb(θb(1)), then
αa(t+1)
αb(t+1)
> αa(t)αb(t) and La(θa(t + 1)) < La(θa(t)) < Lb(θb(t)) < Lb(θb(t + 1))
will hold ∀t. Moreover, θa(t+ 1) > θa(t) and θb(t+ 1) > θb(t) hold ∀t and (θa(t), θb(t)) will converge to a constant
decision (θ∞a , θ
∞
b ) as t→∞, where θa(1) < θ∞a ≤ δa and θb(1) < θ∞b ≤ φ−1(δa).
(3) If La(θa(1)) = Lb(θb(1)), then
αa(t+1)
αb(t+1)
= αa(t)αb(t) and La(θa(t + 1)) = La(θa(t)) = Lb(θb(t)) = Lb(θb(t + 1))
will hold ∀t. Moreover, θa(t+ 1) = θa(t) and θb(t+ 1) = θb(t) hold ∀t and (θa(t), θb(t)) is a constant decision.
Theorem 2 shows the convergence of decisions θa(t) and θb(t), that if θa(t) moves toward to (resp. far away from)
δa, then θb(t) will move far away from (resp. toward to) δb. It means that once a group suffer the higher loss than
the other, it will always suffer the higher loss (See Fig. 3). Therefore, once αa(t)αb(t) starts to change (either becoming
smaller or larger), it will continue changing in that direction (smaller or larger). As a consequence, group representation
disparity will get exacerbated. The fact that one-shot decisions converge to a constant decision immediately results in
the convergence of groups proportion αk(t) and the expected total loss Lt(θa(t), θb(t)).
Corollary 1. Consider (θ∞a , θ∞b ), the greedy decisions converge to under either the Simple, EqOpt or StatPar fair-
ness, then we have the following: (1) limt→∞Nk(t) = βk1−ν(Lk(θ∞k )) , k ∈ {a, b}. (2) limt→∞
αa(t)
αb(t)
= βaβb
1−ν(Lb(θ∞b ))
1−ν(La(θ∞a ))
(3) limt→∞ Lt(θa(t), θb(t)) = Lb(θ∞b ) +
La(θ
∞
a )−Lb(θ∞b )
1+
βb
βa
1−ν(La(θ∞a ))
1−ν(Lb(θ∞b ))
.
If the expected losses La(θ∞a ) and Lb(θ
∞
b ) are of significant difference, then there is a large gap between ν(La(θ
∞
a ))
and ν(Lb(θ∞b )), and limt→∞ αa(t) will approach either 0 or 1, i.e., the disadvantaged group will eventually drop out
3This condition will always be satisfied when the system starts from the near empty state.
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Figure 3: Convergence process illustration: let (θa(t), θb(t)) be one-shot fair solution, then θa(t) ∈ [φ(δb), δa] (red
shaded area) and θb(t) ∈ [δb, φ−1(δa)] (blue shaded area) must hold, where (φ(δb), δb), (δa, φ−1(δa)) are two decision
pairs satisfying fairness constraints. The pair (θa(t), θb(t)) will move toward the same direction, i.e., either toward
right (increase) or toward left (decrease), during the entire horizon. If both increase (resp. decrease) as t increases, then
θa(t) becomes closer to (resp. farther away from) δa and La(θa(t)) decreases (resp. increases); θb(t) becomes farther
away from (resp. closer to) δb and Lb(θb(t)) increases (resp. decreases). At the end, the decisions pair will be more in
favor of one group and representation disparity get exacerbated.
and the system will consist mostly of one group. In short, none of the Simple, EqOpt and StatPar fairness criteria
can prevent this type of permanent attrition under dynamics (1).
3.3 Equalized Loss Fairness
We now turn to the fourth fairness criterion, Equalized Loss (EqLos) fairness. By definition, this criterion seeks to
guarantee that the expected loss experienced by each group to be the same: La(θa(t)) = Lb(θb(t)) (Figure 1(d)).
Let us again consider the greedy decision based on the one-shot solution to the optimization problem (?), where in each
time step we seek to minimize the expected total loss Lt(θa(t), θb(t)) under this constraint.
Theorem 3. Let (θa(t), θb(t)) be the EqLos one-shot fair solution for time step t, then La(θa(t)) = Lb(θb(t)) =
max{minθ La(θ),minθ Lb(θ)}, ∀t. With this solution we have limt→∞ αa(t) = βaβa+βb and limt→∞ αb(t) =
βb
βa+βb
.
Furthermore, under the EqLos fairness, the one-shot decision is a solution to the infinite horizon problem (??). In other
words, the sequence of {(θa(t), θb(t))}, where each (θa(t), θb(t)) is a solution to (?) under EqLos fairness, is also a
solution to (??) under EqLos fairness.
There are two main takeaways from Theorem 3. The first and most relevant to the central focus of this paper, is the
fact that under dynamics (1), the EqLos fairness criterion can sustain group representations in accordance with the
group’s natural, exogenous arrivals, rather than inducing representation detached from this natural replenish rate as
a consequence to users’ experiences of loss, which in most cases means exacerbated disparity and in the worst case,
driving one group to extinction entirely. A secondary, but equally interesting observation is that greedy one-shot
decisions using the EqLos constraint (solution to (?)) is in fact an optimal solution to the infinite horizon problem (??).
In other words, if this is the adopted fairness, then the long-term problem has a rather simple solution. This is not the
case with any of the other criterion: Simple, StatPar or EqOpt. In these three cases, the greedy solution (to (?)) is in
general not the same as that to (??); some examples are given in Section 5.
4 Discussion
4.1 When strict monotonicity over Tk doesn’t hold
Similar analysis can be done when Assumption 1 does not hold. Below we show the result for the special case where
f jk(x) = U([kj , kj ]) is uniformly distributed (Fig. 2(b)).
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Theorem 4. Consider the one-shot problem (?) at time step t with group proportions given by αa(t), αb(t). The
one-shot solution (θa(t), θb(t)) under Simple, EqOpt or StatPar fairness satisfies the following:
(θa(t), θb(t)) =

(θ1a, θ
1
b ), if
αa(t)
αb(t)
∈ (0, r1)
(θ2a, θ
2
b ), if
αa(t)
αb(t)
∈ (r1, r2)
...
(θMa , θ
M
b ), if
αa(t)
αb(t)
∈ (rM−1,+∞)
(3)
where the finite number of decision pairs {(θma , θmb )}Mm=1 and {rm}M−1m=1 are different under different fairness criteria
and are determined by feature distributions fa(x), fb(x).
We refer an interested reader to Appendix H for details on this result. Theorem 4 shows that regardless of the group
proportions αa(t), αb(t), there are only a finite number of feasible solution pairs; this is different from the case discussed
in Section 3.
Definition 3. (Visited Decision) Among all the possible one-shot solutions {(θma , θmb )}Mm=1, we say (θma , θmb ) is visited
at time t0 if (θa(t0), θb(t0)) = (θma , θ
m
b ) and (θa(t0−1), θb(t0−1)) 6= (θma , θmb ). Further, (θma , θmb ) is the k-th visited
decision if (θa(t), θb(t)) has changed values (k − 1) times before visiting (θma , θmb ).
The long-term property of applying this one-shot solution is characterized as follows:
Theorem 5. Let Ii = {m|(θma , θmb ) is the i-th visited decision} and {(θIia , θIib )}Ki=1 be the ordered list of all visited
decisions under the Simple, EqOpt or StatPar fairness. It has the following properties:
1. Each decision (θma , θ
m
b ), m = 1, · · · ,M can only be visited at most once, i.e., no decision is revisited.
2. {Ii}Ki=1 is a subsequence of the consecutive numbers (either in descending order or ascending order) among{1, 2, · · · ,M}
3. The number of visited decisions K is finite, and the one-shot decision will converge to a constant decision
(θIKa , θ
IK
b ).
Algorithm 1 in Appendix J also provides a simple method for finding {(θIia , θIib )}Ki=1. Theorem 5, though not the same,
is consistent with the case studied in Section 3: the one-shot solutions (θa(t), θb(t)) in both cases cannot be revisited
and converge to a constant decision. The main results, including the convergence of groups proportion αk(t) and the
failure to prevent group attrition under the Simple, EqOpt and StatPar fairness, continue to hold in this uniform case.
4.2 The role of dynamic model
The current dynamic model is driven by model accuracy, which can be applied to domains such as biometric authenti-
cation, speaker verification, and medical diagnosis. Within this context, our results suggest different groups should
receive the same quality of service in order to maintain presentation. The fact that EqLos maintains representation is
precisely because of this choice of dynamic: we are essentially equalizing departure when equalizing loss. In contrast,
under the other fairness criteria the factor we equalize doesnt match what drives departure, and different loss incurred to
different groups over time causes significant change in group proportion.
Although this model does not capture all scenarios and may not be suitable for some applications, this is an example
to illustrate the fact that there can easily be a mismatch between a particular fairness definition and the underlying
factors driving the system dynamics, and that this mismatch exacerbates representation disparity in the long run. This
conclusion applies to all dynamic models. For instance, consider an alternative model where user retention is driven
only by true positives or false negatives. This could be more suitable for domains such as loan application and hiring
process. In this case it can be shown that EqOpt will do a better job at maintaining group representation (See Figure
6(a) in Section 5). If consider another model where for the same group Gk (k ∈ {a, b}), the sub-groups with different
labels, i.e., G0k and G
1
k, are driven by different factors (e.g., false positives and false negatives), then none of these four
fairness criteria can maintain the group representation (See Figure. 6(b) in Section 5).
In reality the true dynamic is likely a function of a mixture of factors given the application context. The model used in
the paper is an example that serves to highlight the fact that fairness has to be addressed with a good understanding
of how user actions are affected by their perceptions of the algorithm. In other words, fairness cannot be defined in a
one-shot problem setting without considering the long-run impact, and that long-run impact cannot be properly analyzed
without understanding the underlying dynamics.
The importance of dynamics in evaluating fairness is also pointed out by [13], which focuses on two consecutive time
steps and constructs a one-step feedback model that characterizes the impact of fairness criteria on changing each
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individual’s feature and reshaping the entire population. Specifically, it considers a lending scenario and shows that
under certain conditions, imposing StatPar and EqOpt can potentially be harmful to minority group and reshape the
average feature (e.g., credit score). Different from [13], this work regards each individual’s feature as fixed and the
users’ feedback is described by a retention/attrition model. Instead of considering the impact of fairness criteria on each
group’s average feature (e.g., credit score of a disadvantaged group decreases), we focus on their long-term impact on
group representation over infinite horizon (e.g., the extinction of one group in the system).
4.3 Impact of classifier’s quality
As users leave the system, another potential problem is the negative impact on the quality of the classifier, e.g., if users
are also contributors to the training dataset, which the current model does not take into account. What we have modeled
is the change in total loss induced by different group proportions, where the overall objective is dominated by the
larger group, and the model for minority group can deviate more from its own optimum. We show that even with these
Bayes optimal decisions, the group representation disparity can be exacerbated when imposing inappropriate fairness
constraints.
If we further model the impact of classifier quality, this exacerbation could potentially get more severe, especially once
a group starts to go down in size (See Fig. 7 in Section 5).
4.4 Non-constant or unknown arrival βk
We have assumed that the system dynamics follows (1), where βk denotes constant amount of arrival in each time step.
Below we discuss two relaxations to this.
i) No information on arrival dynamics: Even if we do not know the retention/attrition dynamics, we still are able to
find the optimal decision parameter (θa(t), θb(t)) under equalized loss constraint. The EqLos one-shot fair solution for
time step t is given by,
minθa(t),θb(t) αa(t)La(θa(t)) + αb(t)Lb(θb(t))
s.t., La(θa(t)) = Lb(θb(t)).
As La(θa(t) = Lb(θb(t)), the above optimization is equivalent to the following problem.
minθa(t),θb(t) La(θa(t)) or Lb(θb(t))
s.t., La(θa(t)) = Lb(θb(t)),
As the EqLos one-shot fair solution for time step t does not depend on the group proportion and dynamics model,
(θ∗a(t), θ
∗
b (t)) is the solution to the infinite horizon problem (??) under EqLos constraint for any arbitrary dynamics.
Interestingly, the optimal EqLos fair decision (θ∗a(t), θ
∗
b (t)) can be found by solving unconstrained optimization
problems and La(θ∗a(t)) = Lb(θ
∗
b (t)) = max{minθ La(θ),minθ Lb(θ)}.
ii) Random arrival βk: Now consider the arrival model (1) with βk(t) being a positive random variable with mean
value µk, k ∈ {a, b}. It is easy to see that Nk(t) under equalized loss criterion is given by,
Nk(t) = Nk(1)ν(Lk(θ
∗
k))
t−1 +
t−1∑
i=1
βk(i)ν(Lk(θ
∗
k))
t−1−i
lim
t→∞E(Nk(t)) =
µk
1− ν(Lk(θ∗k))
, lim
t→∞
E(Na(t))
E(Nb(t))
=
µa
µb
Therefore, we arrive at a similar result as in Theorem 3 under the EqLos constraint: 1) one-shot fair solution is the
solution to the infinite horizon problem, and 2) EqLos fairness is able to sustain group representation in accordance
with expected arrivals.
4.5 Case of incomplete information
So far we have assumed that key parameters of the system are known or observable to the decision maker, thereby
resulting in a deterministic problem. This requirement may be relaxed for some parameters as discussed above. In
general, if these parameters, including the arrival dynamics, instantaneous group proportion, etc., are not observable,
but the underlying random processes driving these quantities have known distributions, then a Markov decision process
(MDP) may be formulated, turning the deterministic sequential problem into a stochastic sequential decision problem.
The resulting problem is likely to be analytically intractable unless one imposes strong assumptions. It is however
possible to use approximation techniques as well as value/policy iteration techniques [17] to look for solutions.
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Figure 4: Sample paths for truncated normal example under different fairness criteria when βa + βb = 20000. Group
proportion αa(t) and average total loss are shown in Figure 4(a)4(b) respectively: solid lines are for the case βa = βb,
dashed lines for βa = 3βb, and dotted dashed lines for βa = βb/3. Figure 4(c) shows the existence of a solution
(non-greedy) that can achieve lower average total loss under Simple, StatPar and EqOpt fairness criteria.
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Figure 5: Each dot in Figure 5(a)-5(d) represents the final group proportion limt→∞ αa(t) of one sample path under a
pair of arriving rates (βa, βb). If the group representation is sustained, then limt→∞ αa(t) = 11+βb/βa for each pair of
(βa, βb), as shown in Figure 5(d) under EqLos fairness. Representation disparity is illustrated under Simple, StatPar
and EqOpt fairness, where limt→∞ αa(t) = 1
1+
βb(1−ν(La(θ∞a )))
βa(1−ν(Lb(θ∞b )))
depends on the converged decision (θ∞a , θ
∞
b ) and the
group’s retention degrades if it suffers the higher loss.
5 Experiments
We performed a set of experiments on synthetic data where every Gjk, k ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {0, 1} follows either the uniform
(Fig 2(b)) or the truncated normal (Fig 2(a)) distributions. We only present results on the latter in this section; similar
results for uniform distributions can be found in Appendix K.2. A sequence of greedy decisions under different fairness
constraints are used and group population size changes over time according to (1). For detailed information about
parameters and experimental setup, please refer to Appendix K.1.
Figure 4 shows sample paths of the group proportion and average total loss using greedy decisions under various
fairness criteria and different combinations of βa, βb. As our analysis predicted, in all cases convergence is reached
(we did not include the decisions θk(t) but convergence holds there as well). In particular, under EqLos fairness, the
group representation is sustained throughout the horizon, with an average total loss comparable to using other fairness
constraints (Fig. 4(b))4.
By contrast, under other fairness constraints, even a “major” group (one with a larger arrival βk) can overtime be
significantly marginalized (blue/green dashed line in Fig. 4(a)). This occurs when the loss of the minor group happens
to be smaller than that of the major group, which is determined by feature distributions of the two groups (see Appendix
K.3). Whenever this is the case, the greedy decision will seek to increase the minor group’s proportion in order to drive
down the average loss.
4For the uniform distribution example shown in Appendix K.2, the average total loss of EqLos fairness can be even smaller.
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In addition to these sample paths, we also illustrate the sub-optimality of the greedy decisions under the Simple, EqOpt
and StatPar fairness criteria for the infinite horizon problem (??). In Theorem 3 we established such optimality for
the EqLos greedy fair decision, but this does not in general hold for all the other fairness criteria. Figure 4(c) shows
examples where a non-greedy policy can perform better over the long horizon.
Figure 5 further illustrates the final group proportion (the converged state) as a function of the exogenous arrival sizes
βa and βb under different fairness criteria. As seen, with the exception of EqLos fairness, the group representations are
severely skewed in the long run, with the system consisting mostly of Gb, even for scenarios when Ga has larger arrival,
i.e., βa > βb. A particularly interesting observation is in Fig. 5(b), which approximately splits into three regions, which
means that a minor change in βa and βb can result in very different representation in the long run; in other words,
poor robustness. The same phenomenon could be observed under Simple and EqOpt fairness as well given a different
choice of feature distributions; see Appendix K.2 for more examples.
As discussed in Section 4.2, if adopt different dynamic models, different fairness criteria should be adopted to maintain
group representation. The key point is that the fairness definition should match the factors that drive user departure and
arrival. Two examples with different dynamics and the performance of four fairness criteria are demonstrated in Fig. 6.
(a) Users from Gk are driven by false negative rate
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Figure 6: Sample paths under different dynamic models: Three cases are demonstrated including βa = βb (solid
curves); βa = 3βb (dashed curves); βa = βb/3 (dotted dash curves). Fig. 6(a) illustrates the model where the user
departure is driven by false negative rate: Nk(t+ 1) = Nk(t)ν(FNk(θk(t))) + βk, with FNk(θk(t)) =
∫∞
θk(t)
f0k (x)dx.
Under this model EqOpt is better at maintaining representation. Fig. 6(b) illustrates the model where the users from
each sub-group Gjk are driven by their own perceived loss: N
j
k(t + 1) = N
j
k(t)ν(L
j
k(θk(t))) + g
j
kβk, with L
j
k(θk)
being false positives for j = 0 and false negatives for j = 1. Under this model none of four criteria can maintain group
representation.
As discussed in Section 4.3, if f jk(x) is unknown to decision maker and the decision is learned from users in the system,
then as users leave the system the decision can be more inaccurate and the exacerbation could potentially get more
severe. In order to illustrate it, we first modify the dynamic model such that the users’ arrivals are also effected by the
model accuracy5, i.e.,
Nk(t+ 1) = (Nk(t) + βk)ν(Lk(θk(t))) (4)
Under dynamic (4), we compare the performance of two cases: (i) the Bayes optimal decisions are applied in every
round; and (ii) decisions in (t+ 1)-th round are learned from the remaining users in t-th round. The empirical results
are shown in Fig. 7 where each solid curve (resp. dashed curve) is a sample path of case (i) (resp. case (ii)). Although
βa = βb, Gb suffers the less loss at the beginning and starts to dominant the overall objective gradually. It results in the
less and less users from group Ga than Gb in the sample pool and the model trained from minority group Ga suffers
an additional loss due to its insufficient samples. In contrast, as Gb dominants more in the objective and its loss may
be decreased compared with the case (i) (See Fig. 7(c)). As a consequent, the exacerbation in group representation
disparity gets more severe (See Fig. 7(a)).
5The size of one group can decrease in this case, while the size of two groups is always increasing for the dynamic (1).
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Figure 7: Impact of the classifier’s quality: dashed curves represent the results for decisions learned from users (case
(ii)), solid curves represent the results for Bayes optimal decisions (case (i)). It shows the exacerbation of group disparity
get more severe under case (ii) for Simple, EqOpt and StatPar criteria.
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Figure 8: Trade-off between average total loss and fairness under Simple, EqLos and MinMax loss: solid and dashed
lines denote two examples with different feature distributions.
We end this section by comparing EqLos fair decision with the policy suggested in [1], minimizing maximum loss
(MinMax): θ∗(t) = arg minθ max{La(θ), Lb(θ)}. Fig. 8 shows in general Simple can achieve the lowest loss but Ga
eventually disappears entirely. EqLos sustains group representation but may result in higher loss compared to MinMax
in this example, but presents a better tradeoff: at the same group representation level MinMax comes with higher loss
than Eqlos.
6 Conclusion
This paper characterizes the long-term property of fair machine learning in a sequential setting. We show the convergence
of the decision under a particular dynamic model, and that both statistical parity and equal opportunity fairness can
exacerbate group representation disparity over time. In contrast, Equalized loss fairness can maintain the group
representation. Our results highlight the fact that the fairness cannot be tested in a one-shot problem, it must be defined
with the good understanding of dynamics, i.e., how users react according to the decisions.
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Appendix
A Notation table
Notation Description
Gk, k ∈ {a, b} two demographic groups
Gjk, j ∈ {0, 1} subgroup with label j in Gk
αjk size of G
j
k as a fraction of entire population
αk size of Gk as a fraction of entire population, i.e., α0a + α
1
k
gjk fraction of subgroup with label j in Gk, i.e., α
j
k/αk, i.e., Pr(Y = j|K = k)
f jk(x) feature distribution of G
j
k, i.e., Pr(X = x|K = k, Y = j)
gjkf
j
k(x) feature distribution of Gk that has label j, i.e., Pr(X = x, Y = j|K = k)
fk(x) feature distribution of Gk, i.e., Pr(X = x|K = k) and fk(x) = g1kf1k (x) + g0kf0k (x)
f(x) feature distribution over the entire population, i.e.,
∑
k∈{a,b},j∈{0,1} α
j
kf
j
k(x)
hθ(x) decision rule parameterized by θ
θk decision parameter for Gk
Lk(θk) expected loss incurred to Gk by taking decision θk
L(θa, θb) total expected loss, i.e.,
∑
k∈{a,b} αkLk(θk)
ΓC(θa, θb) a fairness constraint imposed on θa and θb for two groups
Nk(t) expected number of users from Gk at time t
ν(Lk(θk(t))) retention rate of Gk at time t when imposing decision θk(t)
βk number of exogenous arrivals to Gk at every time step
[kj , kj ] bounded support of distribution f
j
k(x)
δk optimal decision for Gk such that δk = arg minθ Lk(θ) and satisfies g
1
kf
1
k (δk) = g
0
kf
0
k (δk)
φ(·) a increasing function determined by constraint ΓC(θa, θb) mapping θb to θa, i.e., ΓC(φ(θb), θb)
B Proof of Lemma 1
Proof by contradiction.
Let V = {(θa, θb)|θa ∈ [φ(δb), δa], θb ∈ [δb, φ−1(δa)], hC(θa, θb) = 0}.
Since for Simple, EqOpt, StatPar fairness, any (θa, θb) and (θ′a, θ
′
b) that satisfy constraints hC(θa, θb) = 0 and
hC(θ′a, θ
′
b) = 0, θa ≥ θ′a if and only if θb ≥ θ′b. Suppose (θˇa, θˇb) satisfies hC(θˇa, θˇb) = 0 and (θˇa, θˇb) =
arg minθa,θb L(θa, θb) /∈ V , then one of the followings must hold: (1) θˇa < φ(δb), θˇb < δb; (2) θˇa > δa, θˇb > φ−1(δa).
Consider two cases separately.
(1) θˇa < φ(δb), θˇb < δb
Since Lb(θˇb) > Lb(δb), to satisfy L(θˇa, θˇb) < L(φ(δb), δb), La(θˇa) < La(φ(δb)) must hold. However, under the
Assumption 1, La(θa) is strictly decreasing on [a0, δa] and strictly increasing on [δa, a1]. Since θˇa < φ(δb) < δa,
which implies La(θˇa) > La(φ(δb)). Therefore, (θˇa, θˇb) cannot be the optimal pair.
(2) θˇa > δa, θˇb > φ−1(δa)
Since La(θˇa) > La(δa), to satisfy L(θˇa, θˇb) < L(δa, φ−1(δa)), Lb(θˇb) < Lb(φ−1(δa)) must hold. However, under
the Assumption 1, Lb(θb) is strictly decreasing on [b0, δb] and strictly increasing on [δb, b1]. Since θˇb > φ
−1(δa) > δb,
which implies Lb(θˇb) > Lb(φ−1(δa)). Therefore, (θˇa, θˇb) cannot be the optimal pair.
C Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1 is based on the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. Consider the one-shot problem (?) at some time step t, with group proportions given by αa(t), αb(t). Under
Assumption 1 the greedy decision (θa(t), θb(t)) for this time step is unique and satisfies the following:
(1) Under EqOpt fairness:
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• If θb(t) ∈ [b1,min{b0, φ−1(a1)}], then f
1
b (θb(t))
f0b (θb(t))
=
g0b
g1b
+
αa(t)g
0
a
αb(t)g1b
.
• If θb(t) ∈ [max{b1, φ−1(a1)},min{b0, φ−1(a0)}], then f
1
b (θb(t))
f0b (θb(t))
=
g0b
g1b
+
αa(t)g
0
a
αb(t)g1b
− g1aαa(t)f1a(φ(θb(t)))
g1bαb(t)f
0
a(φ(θb(t)))
.
(2) Under StatPar fairness:
• If θb(t) ∈ [b1,min{b0, φ−1(a1)}], then f
1
b (θb(t))
f0b (θb(t))
=
g0b
g1b
(
1+
αa(t)
αb(t)
1−αa(t)
αb(t)
).
• If θb(t) ∈ [max{b1, φ−1(a1)},min{b0, φ−1(a0)}], then αb(t)αa(t) =
(
g1bf
1
b (θb(t))
g0
b
f0
b
(θb(t))
+1)(1− g
1
af
1
a(φ(θb(t)))
g0af
0
a(φ(θb(t)))
)
(
g1
b
f1
b
(θb(t))
g0
b
f0
b
(θb(t))
−1)( g1af1a(φ(θb(t)))
g0af
0
a(φ(θb(t)))
+1)
.
• If θb(t) ∈ [max{a1, φ−1(b0)}, a0], then f
1
a(φ(θb(t)))
f0a(φ(θb(t)))
=
g0a
g1a
(
1− αb(t)
αa(t)
1+
αb(t)
αa(t)
).
(3) Under Simple fairness:
• If we further assume δa, δb ∈ Ta ∩ Tb6, then αb(t)αa(t) =
g0af
0
a(θb(t))−g1af1a(θb(t))
g1bf
1
b (θb(t))−g0bf0b (θb(t))
.
Proof. We focus on the case when g1af
1
a (a1) < g
0
af
0
a (a1) & g
1
af
1
a (a0) > g
0
af
0
a (a0) and g
1
bf
1
b (b1) <
g0bf
0
b (b1) & g
1
bf
1
b (b0) > g
0
bf
0
b (b0). That is, θ
∗
k = arminθLk(θ) = δk holds for k = a, b
The constraint hC(θa, θb) = 0 can be rewritten as θa = φ(θb) for some strictly increasing function φ. Then
dφ(θb)
dθb
= −
∂hC(θa,θb)
∂θb
∂hC(θa,θb)
∂θa
|θa=φ(θb). For the EqOpt fairness, dφ(θb)dθb =
f0b (θb)
f0a(φ(θb))
, for StatPar fairness, dφ(θb)dθb =
g0bf
0
b (θb)+g
1
bf
1
b (θb)
g0af
0
a(φ(θb))+g
1
af
1
a(φ(θb))
, for Simple fairness, dφ(θb)dθb = 1.
The one-shot problem can be expressed with only one variable, either θa or θb, here we express in θb. At each
round, decision maker find θb(t) = arg minθb L
t(θb) = αaLa(φ(θb)) + αbLb(θb) and θa(t) = φ(θb(t)). Since
φ(δb) < δa ( φ−1(δa) > δb), then each (θa(t), θb(t)) can have 3 possibilities: (1) θa(t) ∈ [a0, a1], θb(t) ∈ [b1, b0]; (2)
θa(t) ∈ [a1, a0], θb(t) ∈ [b1, b0]; (3) θa(t) ∈ [a1, a0], θb(t) ∈ [b0, b1]. For EqOpt and StatPar, consider each case
separately.
Case 1: θa(t) ∈ [a0, a1], θb(t) ∈ [b1, b0]
Let θmaxb = min{b0, φ−1(a1)}, which is the maximum value θb can take for case 1.
Lt(θb) = αb(t)
∫ θb
b1
g1bf
1
b (x)− g0bf0b (x)dx− αa(t)
∫ φ(θb)
a0
g0af
0
a (x)dx+ αa(t)g
0
a + αb(t)
∫ b0
b1
g0bf
0
b (x)dx
Take derivative w.r.t. θb gives
dLt(θb)
dθb
= αb(t)(g
1
bf
1
b (θb)− g0bf0b (θb))− αa(t)g0af0a (φ(θb))dφ(θb)dθb .
1. EqOpt greedy fair decision:
dLt(θb)
dθb
= αb(t)(g
1
bf
1
b (θb)−g0bf0b (θb))−αa(t)g0af0b (θb), since g1bf1b (θb)−g0bf0b (θb) is increasing from negative
to positive and f0b (θb) is decreasing over [b1, b0].
dLt(θb)
dθb
is increasing over [b1, b0]. There are two possibilities:
(i) αa(t)αb(t) <
g1bf
1
b (θ
max
b )−g0bf0b (θmaxb )
g0af
0
b (θ
max
b )
, i.e., dL
t(θb)
dθb
|θb=θmaxb > 0→ ∃θb(t) such that
dLt(θb)
dθb
|θb=θb(t) = 0, then
θb(t) satisfies:
f1b (θb(t))
f0b (θb(t))
=
g0b
g1b
+
αa(t)g
0
a
αb(t)g1b
and it is unique given αa(t), αb(t). (ii)
αa(t)
αb(t)
≥ g1bf1b (θmaxb )−g0bf0b (θmaxb )
g0af
0
b (θ
max
b )
,
i.e., dL
t(θb)
dθb
≤ 0,∀θb ∈ [b1, θmaxb ]→ θb(t) ≥ θmaxb .
2. StatPar greedy fair decision:
dLt(θb)
dθb
= αb(t)(g
1
bf
1
b (θb) − g0bf0b (θb)) − αa(t) g
1
bf
1
b (θb)+g
0
bf
0
b (θb)
1+
g1af
1
a(φ(θb))
g0af
0
a(φ(θb))
= αb(t)(g
1
bf
1
b (θb) − g0bf0b (θb)) −
αa(t)(g
1
bf
1
b (θb) + g
0
bf
0
b (θb)), where the last equality is because f
1
a (φ(θb)) = 0 over [a0, a1]. Since f
1
b (x) is
6This extra assumption on simple case applies to Theorem 2
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increasing and f0b (x) is decreasing over [b1, b0]. (i) If ∃θb(t) such that dL
t(θb)
dθb
|θb=θb(t) = 0, then f
1
b (θb(t))
f0b (θb(t))
=
g0b
g1b
(
1+
αa(t)
αb(t)
1−αa(t)
αb(t)
) and θb(t) is unique given αa(t), αb(t). (ii) If
dLt(θb)
dθb
≤ 0,∀θb ∈ [b1, θmaxb ]→ θb(t) ≥ θmaxb .
Case 2: θa(t) ∈ [a1, a0], θb(t) ∈ [b1, b0]
Let θmaxb = min{b0, φ−1(a0)} and θminb = max{b1, φ−1(a1)} be the maximum and minimum value respectively
that θb can take for case 2. Lt(θb) = αb(t)
∫ θb
b1
g1bf
1
b (x) − g0bf0b (x)dx + αa(t)
∫ φ(θb)
a1
g1af
1
a (x) − g0af0a (x)dx +
αb(t)
∫ b0
b1
g0bf
0
b (x)dx+ αa(t)
∫ a0
a1
g0af
0
a (x)dx
Take derivative w.r.t. θb gives
dLt(θb)
dθb
= αb(t)(g
1
bf
1
b (θb)− g0bf0b (θb)) + αa(t)(g1af1a (φ(θb))− g0af0a (φ(θb)))dφ(θb)dθb .
1. EqOpt greedy fair decision:
dLt(θb)
dθb
= αb(t)(g
1
bf
1
b (θb) − g0bf0b (θb)) + αa(t)(g1a f
1
a(φ(θb))
f0a(φ(θb))
− g0a)f0b (θb) = ((g1a f
1
a(φ(θb))
f0a(φ(θb))
− g0a)αa(t) −
g0bαb(t))f
0
b (θb) + g
1
bf
1
b (θb)αb(t), since g
1
a
f1a(φ(θb))
f0a(φ(θb))
− g0a is increasing and g1bf1b (θb)− g0bf0b (θb) is increasing
over [θminb , θ
max
b ]. Since f
0
a (φ(θ
max
b )) = f
0
b (θ
max
b ) = 0 under EqOpt fairness,
dLt(θb)
dθb
is increasing to positive
over [θminb , θ
max
b ]. There are two possibilities: (i) If
dLt(θb)
dθb
|θb=θminb < 0→ ∃θb(t) such that
dLt(θb)
dθb
|θb=θb(t) =
0, then θb(t) satisfies:
f1b (θb(t))
f0b (θb(t))
=
g0b
g1b
+
αa(t)g
0
a
αb(t)g1b
− g1aαa(t)f1a(φ(θb(t)))
g1bαb(t)f
0
a(φ(θb(t)))
and it is unique given αa(t), αb(t). (ii)
If dL
t(θb)
dθb
|θb=θminb ≥ 0→
dLt(θb)
dθb
≥ 0,∀θb ∈ [θminb , θmaxb ]→ θb(t) ≤ θminb .
2. StatPar greedy fair decision:
dLt(θb)
dθb
= αb(t)(g
1
bf
1
b (θb) − g0bf0b (θb)) + αa(t)(g0bf0b (θb) + g1bf1b (θb)) g
1
af
1
a(φ(θb))−g0af0a(φ(θb))
g1af
1
a(φ(θb))+g
0
af
0
a(φ(θb))
. dL
t(θb)
dθb
is
increasing over [θminb , θ
max
b ]. There are three possibilities: (i) If ∃θb(t) such that dL
t(θb)
dθb
|θb=θb(t) = 0, then
αb(t)
αa(t)
=
(
g1bf
1
b (θb(t))
g0
b
f0
b
(θb(t))
+1)(1− g
1
af
1
a(φ(θb(t)))
g0af
0
a(φ(θb(t)))
)
(
g1
b
f1
b
(θb(t))
g0
b
f0
b
(θb(t))
−1)( g1af1a(φ(θb(t)))
g0af
0
a(φ(θb(t)))
+1)
and such θb(t) is unique given αa(t), αb(t). (ii) If
dLt(θb)
dθb
≥ 0,∀θb ∈
[θminb , θ
max
b ]→ θb(t) ≤ θminb . (iii) If dL
t(θb)
dθb
≤ 0,∀θb ∈ [θminb , θmaxb ]→ θb(t) ≥ θmaxb .
Case 3: θa(t) ∈ [a1, a0], θb(t) ∈ [b0, b1]
Express Lt(θa, θb) as function of θa, the analysis will be similar to case 1.
Let θmina = max{a1, φ(b0)}, which is the minimum value θa can take for case 3.
Lt(θa) = αa(t)
∫ θa
a1
g1af
1
a (x)− g0af0a (x)dx+ αb(t)
∫ φ−1(θa)
b1
g1bf
1
b (x)dx+ αa(t)
∫ a0
a1
g0af
0
a (x)dx
Take derivative w.r.t. θa gives
dLt(θa)
dθa
= αa(t)(g
1
af
1
a (θa)− g0af0a (θa)) + αb(t)g1bf1b (φ−1(θa))dφ
−1(θa)
dθa
.
Since θb(t) ∈ [b0, b1] is not possible for EqOpt greedy fair decision, Case 3 only considers the StatPar greedy fair
decision.
dLt(θa)
dθa
= αa(t)(g
1
af
1
a (θa)−g0af0a (θa))+αb(t) g
1
af
1
a(θa)+g
0
af
0
a(θa)
1+
g0
b
f0
b
(φ−1(θa))
g0
b
f0
b
(φ−1(θa))
= αa(t)(g
1
af
1
a (θa)−g0af0a (θa))+αb(t)(g1af1a (θa)+
g0af
0
a (θa)), where the last equality is because f
0
b (φ
−1(θa)) = 0 over [b0, b1]. Since f1a (x) is increasing and f
0
a (x) is
decreasing over [a1, a0]. (i) If ∃θa(t) such that dL
t(θa)
dθa
|θa=θa(t) = 0, then f
1
a(θa(t))
f0a(θa(t))
=
g0a
g1a
(
1− αb(t)
αa(t)
1+
αb(t)
αa(t)
) and θa(t) is unique
given αa(t), αb(t). (ii) If
dLt(θa)
dθa
≥ 0,∀θa ∈ [b1, θmina ]→ θa(t) ≤ θmina .
Now consider Simple greedy decision, where θa(t) = θb(t) = θ(t). Since δa > δb, under the condition that both
δa, δb ∈ Ta ∩ Tb and according to Lemma 1, there could be only one case: θ(t) ∈ [a1, b0].
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Take derivative w.r.t. θ gives dL
t(θ)
dθ = αb(t)(g
1
bf
1
b (θ)− g0bf0b (θ)) + αa(t)(g1af1a (θ)− g0af0a (θ)). dL
t(θ)
dθ is increasing
from negative to positive over [δb, δa], ∃θ(t) such that dL
t(θ)
dθ |θ=θ(t) = 0, and it satisfies αb(t)αa(t) =
g0af
0
a(θ(t))−g1af1a(θ(t))
g1bf
1
b (θ(t))−g0bf0b (θ(t))
.
Based on Lemma 3 and under Assumption 1, for all three notions of fairness, the larger θb(t) and θa(t) will result in the
larger αa(t)αb(t) . Therefore,
αa(t)
αb(t)
= ΨC(θa(t), θb(t)) for some increasing function ΨC , which may not have the analytic
expression.
D Proof of Lemma 2
Group labels a, b are assigned to two groups such that φ(δb) < δa and δb < φ−1(δa). According to Lemma 1,
θa(t) ∈ [φ(δb), δa] and [δb, φ−1(δa)]. Since Lk(θk) is decreasing over [k0, δk] and increasing over [δk, k1], for
k ∈ {a, b}. If θa ≥ θ′a and θb ≥ θ′b, then La(θa) ≤ La(θ′a) and Lb(θb) ≥ Lb(θ′b). Lemma 2 is proved.
E Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 is proved based on the following lemmas.
Lemma 4. For the function f(t) = 1−a
t
1−bt , t ∈ Z+, where a, b ∈ (0, 1) are two constants. If 0 < a < b < 1, then
f(t) is strictly decreasing in t and f(t) > 1,∀t ∈ Z+; if 0 < b < a < 1, then f(t) is strictly increasing in t and
f(t) < 1,∀t ∈ Z+.
Proof. Consider
f(t)− f(t+ 1) = 1− a
t
1− bt −
1− at+1
1− bt+1 =
1
(1− bt)(1− bt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
((1− at)(1− bt+1)− (1− at+1)(1− bt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(t)
If 0 < a < b < 1, re-organize g(t) as
g(t) = bt(1− b)− at(1− a) + atbt(b− a) = bt(1− b)− at(1− b+ b− a) + atbt(b− a)
= (bt − at)(1− b)− at(1− bt)(b− a) = at(1− b)((( b
a
)t − 1)− a( b
a
− 1)1− b
t
1− b )
= at(1− b)( b
a
− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
1− (b/a)t
1− b/a − a
1− bt
1− b )
and there is:
1− (b/a)t
1− b/a =
t−1∑
i=0
(
b
a
)i >
t−1∑
i=0
1 > a
t−1∑
i=0
bi = a
1− bt
1− b
Thus, g(t) > 0,∀t ∈ Z+, implies f(t) > f(t + 1),∀t ≥ 0, i.e., f(t) is a strictly increasing function. Furthermore,
f(t) < limt→∞ f(t) = 1,∀t ∈ Z+.
Similarly, if 0 < b < a < 1, by the above analysis, 1f(t) =
1−bt
1−at is strictly increasing function, implies f(t) is strictly
decreasing function. Furthermore, f(t) > limt→∞ f(t) = 1,∀t ∈ Z+.
Lemma 5. For the function g(t) =
∑t−1
i=0 a
i+atKa∑t−1
i=0 b
i+btKb
, t ∈ Z+, where a, b ∈ (0, 1) and Ka,Kb are constants. Let
C1 ≥ C2 > 0 be constants. If 0 < a < b < 1, KaKb > C1 and Kb < 11−b , then g(t) is strictly decreasing in t and
∃t0 such that g(t0) < C2 if and only if 1−b1−a < C2; if 0 < b < a < 1, KaKb < C2 and Ka < 11−a , then g(t) is strictly
increasing in t and ∃t0 such that g(t0) > C1 if and only if 1−b1−a > C1.
Proof. First consider the case 0 < a < b < 1.
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To compare g(t) and C2, consider:
g(t)− C2 =
∑t−1
i=0 a
i + atKa − C2(
∑t−1
i=0 b
i + btKb)∑t−1
i=0 b
i + btKb
=
1
1−a +
at
1−atKa − C2( 1−b
t
1−at
1
1−b +
bt
1−atKb)
1
1−at (
∑t−1
i=0 b
i + btKb)
(5)
Let the numerator of (5) be h(t) and re-organize it gives:
h(t) =
1
1− a +
at
1− atKa −
1− bt
1− at
C2
1− b −
bt
1− atC2Kb
=
1
1− a +
1
1− at (a
tKa −Ka +Ka − C2Kb + C2Kb − btC2Kb)− 1− b
t
1− at
C2
1− b
=
1
1− a −Ka +
Ka − C2Kb
1− at + C2(Kb −
1
1− b )
1− bt
1− at
Since 11−at is strictly decreasing in t and
1−bt
1−at is strictly increasing in t by Lemma 4, if
Ka
Kb
> C1 ≥ C2 and Kb < 11−b
also hold, then h(t) is strictly decreasing in t. Since
∑t−1
i=0 b
i + btKb is increasing in t when Kb < 11−b . g(t) is strictly
decreasing in t . If ∃t0 such that g(t0) < C2, i.e., ∃t0 such that h(t0) < 0, then 0 > h(t0) > limt→∞ h(t) = 11−a− C21−b
must also hold. Therefore, If 1−b1−a < C2, then ∃t0 such that g(t0) < C2; if 1−b1−a ≥ C2, then g(t) ≥ C2, ∀t.
Similarly, if 0 < b < a < 1, using the above analysis, it can be concluded that if KbKa >
1
C2
and Ka < 11−a , then
1
g(t) is
strictly decreasing in t and ∃t0 such that 1g(t0) < 1C1 if and only if 1−a1−b < 1C1 . Re-written it becomes: if KaKb < C2 and
Ka <
1
1−a , then g(t) is strictly increasing in t and ∃t0 such that g(t0) > C1 if and only if 1−b1−a > C1.
Prove Theorem 2 by induction. To simplify the notation, denote νsk = ν(Lk(θk(s))). Since Nk(2) = Nk(1)ν
1
k + βk >
Nk(1), k ∈ {a, b}, it implies that Nk(1) < βk1−ν1k .
Base case:
(1) If La(θa(1)) > Lb(θb(1)) → ν1a < ν1b , then αa(2)αb(2) =
Na(1)ν
1
a+βa
Nb(1)ν1b+βb
< Na(1)Nb(1) =
αa(1)
αb(1)
. By Lemma 2, it results in
θa(2) < θa(1) → La(θa(2)) > La(θa(1)) → ν2a < ν1a and θb(2) < θb(1) → Lb(θb(2)) < Lb(θb(1)) → ν2b > ν1b .
Therefore, La(θa(2)) > La(θa(1)) > Lb(θb(1)) > Lb(θb(2))→ ν2b > ν1b > ν1a > ν2a and Nb(2) = Nb(1)ν1b + βb <
βb
1−ν1b
< βb
1−ν2b
.
(2) If La(θa(1)) < Lb(θb(1)) → ν1a > ν1b , then αa(2)αb(2) =
Na(1)ν
1
a+βa
Nb(1)ν1b+βb
> Na(1)Nb(1) =
αa(1)
αb(1)
. By Lemma 2, it results in
θa(2) > θa(1) → La(θa(2)) < La(θa(1)) → ν2a > ν1a and θb(2) > θb(1) → Lb(θb(2)) > Lb(θb(1)) → ν2b < ν1b .
Therefore, La(θa(2)) < La(θa(1)) < Lb(θb(1)) < Lb(θb(2))→ ν2b < ν1b < ν1a < ν2a and Na(2) = Na(1)ν1a + βa <
βa
1−ν1a <
βa
1−ν2a .
(3) If La(θa(1)) = Lb(θb(1)) → ν1a = ν1b , then αa(2)αb(2) =
Na(1)ν
1
a+βa
Nb(1)ν1b+βb
= Na(1)Nb(1) =
αa(1)
αb(1)
and θa(2) = θa(1),
θb(2) = θb(1)→ La(θa(2)) = La(θa(1)) = Lb(θb(1)) = Lb(θb(2)).
Induction Step:
(1) La(θa(1)) > Lb(θb(1))
Suppose Theorem 2 is true for time step n, i.e., αa(n+1)αb(n+1) <
αa(n)
αb(n)
, Nb(n+1) < βb1−ν(Lb(θb(n+1))) and La(θa(n+1)) >
La(θa(n)) > Lb(θb(n)) > Lb(θb(n+ 1)). Show that for time step n+ 1, Theorem 2 also holds.
Define function η(s) =
Na(n)
βa
(νna )
s+
∑s−1
i=0 (ν
n
a )
i
Nb(n)
βb
(νnb )
s+
∑s−1
i=0 (ν
n
b )
i
, since Nb(n)βb <
1
1−νnb ,
Na(n)βb
Nb(n)βa
> Na(n+1)βbNb(n+1)βa and ν
1
a < ν
1
b , by Lemma
5, η(s) is strictly decreasing in s. Therefore, η(2) < η(1) = αa(n+1)αb(n+1) . Since ν
n+1
a < ν
n
a and ν
n+1
b > ν
n
b , it implies
αa(n+2)
αb(n+2)
=
(Na(n)ν
n
a+βa)ν
n+1
a +βa
(Nb(n)νnb +βb)ν
n+1
b +βb
< η(2) < αa(n+1)αb(n+1) . By Lemma 2, it results in θa(n+ 2) < θa(n+ 1)→ La(θa(n+
2)) > La(θa(n+1))→ νn+2a < νn+1a and θb(n+2) < θb(n+1)→ Lb(θb(n+2)) < Lb(θb(n+1))→ νn+2b > νn+1b .
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Therefore, La(θa(n+2)) > La(θa(n+1)) > Lb(θb(n+1)) > Lb(θb(n+2)) andNb(n+2) = Nb(n+1)νn+1b +βb <
βb
1−νn+1b
< βb
1−νn+2b
.
(2) La(θa(1)) < Lb(θb(1))
Suppose Theorem 2 is true for time step n, i.e., αa(n+1)αb(n+1) >
αa(n)
αb(n)
, Na(n+1) < βa1−ν(La(θa(n+1))) and La(θa(n+1)) <
La(θa(n)) < Lb(θb(n)) < Lb(θb(n+ 1)). Show that for time step n+ 1, Theorem 2 also holds.
Define function η(s) =
Na(n)
βa
(νna )
s+
∑s−1
i=0 (ν
n
a )
i
Nb(n)
βb
(νnb )
s+
∑s−1
i=0 (ν
n
b )
i
, since Na(n)βa <
1
1−νna ,
Na(n)βb
Nb(n)βa
< Na(n+1)βbNb(n+1)βa and ν
1
a > ν
1
b , by Lemma
5, η(s) is strictly increasing in s. Therefore, η(2) > η(1) = αa(n+1)αb(n+1) . Since ν
n+1
a > ν
n
a and ν
n+1
b < ν
n
b , it implies
αa(n+2)
αb(n+2)
=
(Na(n)ν
n
a+βa)ν
n+1
a +βa
(Nb(n)νnb +βb)ν
n+1
b +βb
> η(2) > αa(n+1)αb(n+1) . By Lemma 2, it results in θa(n+ 2) > θa(n+ 1)→ La(θa(n+
2)) < La(θa(n+1))→ νn+2a > νn+1a and θb(n+2) > θb(n+1)→ Lb(θb(n+2)) > Lb(θb(n+1))→ νn+2b < νn+1b .
Therefore, La(θa(n+2)) < La(θa(n+1)) < Lb(θb(n+1)) < Lb(θb(n+2)) andNa(n+2) = Na(n+1)νn+1a +βa <
βa
1−νn+1a <
βa
1−νn+2a .
(3) La(θa(1)) = Lb(θb(1))
Suppose Theorem 2 is true for time step n, i.e., αa(n+1)αb(n+1) =
αa(n)
αb(n)
and θk(n+ 1) = θk(n), k ∈ {a, b}. Show that for
time step n+ 1, Theorem 2 also holds.
Since θk(n + 1) = θk(n), k ∈ {a, b} → νn+1k = νnk , k ∈ {a, b}. αa(n+2)αb(n+2) =
Na(n+1)ν
n+1
a +βa
Nb(n+1)ν
n+1
b +βb
= αa(n+1)αb(n+1) and
La(θa(n+ 1)) = La(θa(n)) = Lb(θb(n)) = Lb(θb(n+ 1)).
Finally, combine with Lemma 1 that (θa(t), θb(t)) is bounded by a compact interval, Theorem 2 is complete.
F Proof of Corollary 1
To simplify the notation, denote νsk = ν(Lk(θk(s))), k ∈ {a, b}.
Since limt→∞(θa(t), θb(t)) = (θ∞a , θ
∞
b ), ∀ > 0, ∃t0 such that ∀t > t0, |νtk − ν(Lk(θ∞k ))| <  for both k = a and
k = b.
For t > t0, Nk(t) = Nk(t0)
∏t−t0−1
i=0 ν
t0+i
k + βk(1 +
∑t−t0−1
j=1
∏t−t0−1
i=j ν
t0+i
k ) = Nk(t0)
∏t−t0−1
i=0 (ν
t0
k + ν
t0+i
k −
νt0k ) + βk(1 +
∑t−t0−1
j=1
∏t−t0−1
i=j (ν
t0
k + ν
t0+i
k − νt0k )), the following holds ∀ > 0:
Nk(t0)
t−t0−1∏
i=0
(νt0k −)+βk(1+
t−t0−1∑
j=1
t−t0−1∏
i=j
(νt0k −)) < Nk(t) < Nk(t0)
t−t0−1∏
i=0
(νt0k +)+βk(1+
t−t0−1∑
j=1
t−t0−1∏
i=j
(νt0k +))
βk(1 + lim
t→∞
t−t0−1∑
j=1
t−t0−1∏
i=j
(νt0k − )) < limt→∞Nk(t) < βk(1 + limt→∞
t−t0−1∑
j=1
t−t0−1∏
i=j
(νt0k + ))
Therefore,
limt→∞Nk(t) = βk(1 +
∑∞
j=1(ν(L(θ
∞
k )))
j) = βk1−ν(Lk(θ∞k ))
limt→∞ αa(t) = 1
1+
βb
βa
1−ν(La(θ∞a ))
1−ν(Lb(θ∞b ))
, limt→∞ αb(t) = 1− limt→∞ αa(t)
limt→∞ Lt(θa(t), θb(t)) = limt→∞ αa(t)La(θa(t)) + limt→∞ αb(t)Lb(θb(t)) = Lb(θ∞b ) +
La(θ
∞
a )−Lb(θ∞b )
1+
βb
βa
1−ν(La(θ∞a ))
1−ν(Lb(θ∞b ))
G Proof of Theorem 3
The EqLos one-shot fair solution for time step t is given by,
minθa(t),θb(t) αa(t)La(θa(t)) + αb(t)Lb(θb(t))
s.t., La(θa(t)) = Lb(θb(t)), (6)
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Since La(θa(t) = Lb(θb(t)), we can re-write above optimization problem as follows
minθa(t),θb(t) Lk(θk(t))
s.t., La(θa(t)) = Lb(θb(t)) (7)
where k can be either a or b and has the solution (θ∗a, θ
∗
b ) satisfy La(θ
∗
a(t)) = La(θ
∗
b (t)) =
max{minθ La(θ),minθ Lb(θ)}. Since the optimization (7) doesn’t depend on αa(t), αb(t) and its solution is
the same ∀t. The sequential problem (??) min{(θa(t),θb(t))} limT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1 L(θa(t), θb(t)) has the solution
(θa(t), θb(t)) = (θ
∗
a, θ
∗
b ),∀t.
Note that retention rate for both groups is equal to ν(La(θ∗a)) under Eqlos. Therefore, Nk(t + 1) = βk(1 +∑t−1
j=1(ν(La(θ
∗
a)))
i) + Nk(1)ν(La(θ
∗
a))
t−1, ∀t ≥ 1. Therefore, as t goes to infinity, Nk(t) goes to βk1−ν(La(θ∗a)) ,
implying limt→∞
Na(t)
Nb(t)
= βaβb .
Therefore, limt→∞ αa(t) = βaβa+βb and limt→∞ αb(t) =
βb
βa+βb
∀t.
H Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4 is proved by showing that the Simple , EqOpt and StatPar greedy decision at each round all have the
form of (3). Which are presented in Lemma 6, 7, 8 respectively.
• Simple greedy fair decision
For the simple decision, θa = θb = θ should be satisfied.
Lemma 6. Let A =
g0b
b0−b0
g1a
a1−a1−
g0a
a0−a0
, B =
g0b
b0−b0
− g
1
b
b1−b1
g1a
a1−a1
, C =
g0b
b0−b0
− g
1
b
b1−b1
g1a
a1−a1−
g0a
a0−a0
, then the Simple greedy decision maker at
each time t selects parameter θa(t) = θb(t) = θ(t) based on
αa(t)
αb(t)
and A, B, C according to the following:
(i) If g
1
b
b1−b1
<
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 >
g0a
a0−a0 , then 0 < B < C < A and θ(t) =

b0, if
αa(t)
αb(t)
< B
a0, if B <
αa(t)
αb(t)
< C
b1, if C <
αa(t)
αb(t)
< A
a1, if
αa(t)
αb(t)
> A
(ii) If g
1
b
b1−b1
>
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 >
g0a
a0−a0 , then C < B < 0 < A and θ(t) =
{
b1, if
αa(t)
αb(t)
< A
a1, if
αa(t)
αb(t)
> A
(iii) If g
1
b
b1−b1
<
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 <
g0a
a0−a0 , then A < C < 0 < B and θ(t) =
{
b0, if
αa(t)
αb(t)
< B
a0, if
αa(t)
αb(t)
> B
(iv) If g
1
b
b1−b1
>
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 <
g0a
a0−a0 , then A < B < 0 < C and θ(t) =
{
b1, if
αa(t)
αb(t)
< C
a0, if
αa(t)
αb(t)
> C
Proof. There are 3 possibilities for an optimal θ.
(1) θ ∈ [a1, b1]
Lt(θa, θb) = (
α1a(t)
a1−a1−
α0a(t)
a0−a0−
α0b(t)
b0−b0
)θ+(
α0a(t)a0
a0−a0 −
α1a(t)a1
a1−a1 +
α0b(t)b0
b0−b0
) and θ(t) =
a1, if
α1a(t)
a1−a1 −
α0a(t)
a0−a0 >
α0b(t)
b0−b0
b1, if
α1a(t)
a1−a1 −
α0a(t)
a0−a0 <
α0b(t)
b0−b0
(2) θ ∈ [b1, a0]
Lt(θa, θb) = (
α1a(t)
a1−a1 +
α1b(t)
b1−b1
− α0a(t)a0−a0 −
α0b(t)
b0−b0
)θ + (
α0a(t)a0
a0−a0 −
α1a(t)a1
a1−a1 −
α1b(t)b1
b1−b1
+
α0b(t)b0
b0−b0
) and
θ(t) =
b1, if
α1a(t)
a1−a1 +
α1b(t)
b1−b1
>
α0a(t)
a0−a0 +
α0b(t)
b0−b0
a0, if
α1a(t)
a1−a1 +
α1b(t)
b1−b1
<
α0a(t)
a0−a0 +
α0b(t)
b0−b0
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(3) θ ∈ [a0, b0]
Lt(θa, θb) = (
α1a(t)
a1−a1 +
α1b(t)
b1−b1
− α0b(t)
b0−b0
)θ+(
α0b(t)b0
b0−b0
− α1a(t)a1a1−a1 −
α1b(t)b1
b1−b1
) and θ(t) =
a0, if
α1a(t)
a1−a1 +
α1b(t)
b1−b1
>
α0b(t)
b0−b0
b0, if
α1a(t)
a1−a1 +
α1b(t)
b1−b1
<
α0b(t)
b0−b0
Therefore, replacing αjk(t) as αk(t)g
j
k for k ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {0, 1}. combining and re-organizing the above conditions
implies:
θ(t) =

a1, if αa(t)(
g1a
a1−a1 −
g0a
a0−a0 ) > αb(t)
g0b
b0−b0
b0, if αa(t)
g1a
a1−a1 < αb(t)(
g0b
b0−b0
− g1b
b1−b1
)
b1, if αa(t)(
g1a
a1−a1 −
g0a
a0−a0 ) < αb(t)
g0b
b0−b0
& αa(t)(
g1a
a1−a1 −
g0a
a0−a0 ) > αb(t)(
g0b
b0−b0
− g1b
b1−b1
)
a0, if αa(t)
g1a
a1−a1 > αb(t)(
g0b
b0−b0
− g1b
b1−b1
) & αa(t)(
g1a
a1−a1 −
g0a
a0−a0 ) < αb(t)(
g0b
b0−b0
− g1b
b1−b1
)
Substitute with A, B, C and reorganize gives Lemma 6.
• EqOpt greedy fair decision
For the EqOpt decision,
∫ a0
θa
1
a0−a0 dx =
∫ b0
θb
1
b0−b0
dx should be satisfied. Let θa and θb be defined such that (θa, b1),
(a1, θb) are two pairs satisfying the fairness constraint, i.e.,
a0−θa
a0−a0 =
b0−b1
b0−b0
and a0−a1a0−a0 =
b0−θb
b0−b0
. Without loss of
generality, assuming b0−b1
b0−b0
<
a0−a1
a0−a0 , which implies θb < b1 and θa > a1.
Lemma 7. Let A = (b0−b0)(a0−a0)
g0b
b0−b0
− g
1
b
b1−b1
g1a
a1−a1−
g0a
a0−a0
and B =
g0b
a0−a0
g1a
a1−a1−
g0a
a0−a0
, then the EqOpt greedy one-shot decision maker at
each time t selects parameter pair (θa(t), θb(t)) based on
αa(t)
αb(t)
and A, B according to the following:
(i) If g
1
a
a1−a1 >
g0a
a0−a0 , then A < B(B > 0) and (θa(t), θb(t)) =

(a0, b0), if
αa(t)
αb(t)
< A
(θa, b1), if A <
αa(t)
αb(t)
< B
(a1, θb), if
αa(t)
αb(t)
> B
(ii) If g
1
a
a1−a1 <
g0a
a0−a0 , then A > B(B < 0) and (θa(t), θb(t)) =
{
(θa, b1), if
αa(t)
αb(t)
< A
(a0, b0), if
αa(t)
αb(t)
> A
Proof. There are 2 possibilities for an optimal (θa, θb) pair:
(1) θa ∈ [a1, θa], θb ∈ [θb, b1]
Lt(θa, θb) = (
α1a(t)
a1−a1 −
α0a(t)+α
0
b(t)
a0−a0 )θa +
a0(α
0
a(t)+α
0
b(t))
a0−a0 −
α1a(t)a1
a1−a1
(θa(t), θb(t)) =
(a1, θb), if
α1a(t)
a1−a1 >
α0a(t)+α
0
b(t)
a0−a0
(θa, b1), if
α1a(t)
a1−a1 <
α0a(t)+α
0
b(t)
a0−a0
(2) θa ∈ [θa, a0], θb ∈ [b1, b0].
Lt(θa, θb) = (
α1a(t)
a1−a1 +
α1b(t)
a0−a0
b0−b0
b1−b1
− α0a(t)+α0b(t)a0−a0 )θa +
a0(α
0
a(t)+α
0
b(t))
a0−a0 −
α1a(t)a1
a1−a1 +
α1b(t)(b0−b1)
b1−b1
− α1b(t)a0a0−a0
b0−b0
b1−b1
(θa(t), θb(t)) =
(θa, b1), if
α1a(t)
a1−a1 +
α1b(t)
a0−a0
b0−b0
b1−b1
>
α0a(t)+α
0
b(t)
a0−a0
(a0, b0), if
α1a(t)
a1−a1 +
α1b(t)
a0−a0
b0−b0
b1−b1
<
α0a(t)+α
0
b(t)
a0−a0
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Therefore, replacing αjk(t) as αk(t)g
j
k for k ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {0, 1}. combining and re-organizing the above conditions
implies:
(θa(t), θb(t)) =

(a1, θb), if αa(t)(
g1a
a1−a1 −
g0a
a0−a0 ) > αb(t)
g0b
a0−a0
(θa, b1), if αa(t)(
g1a
a1−a1 −
g0a
a0−a0 ) > αb(t)
b0−b0
a0−a0 (
g0b
b0−b0
− g1b
b1−b1
) & αa(t)(
g1a
a1−a1 −
g0a
a0−a0 ) < αb(t)
g0b
a0−a0
(a0, b0), if αa(t)(
g1a
a1−a1 −
g0a
a0−a0 ) < αb(t)
b0−b0
a0−a0 (
g0b
b0−b0
− g1b
b1−b1
)
Substitute with A, B gives Lemma 7.
• StatPar greedy fair decision
Denote Pk(θk) =
∑
i∈{0,1} g
i
k
∫∞
θk
f ik(x)dx, then for the StatPar decision, Pa(θa) = Pb(θb) should be satisfied.
Let θa, θb, θ˜a, θ˜b be defined such that (θa, b0), (a0, θb), (θ˜a, b1), (a1, θ˜b) are pairs satisfying the statistical parity
fairness constraint, i.e., Pa(θa) = Pb(b0), Pa(a0) = Pb(θb), Pa(θ˜a) = Pb(b1) and Pa(a1) = Pb(θ˜b). Without loss
of generality, assuming θb ∈ [b0, b1], which implies θa < a0. There are three cases and under which θa, θb, θ˜a, θ˜b
satisfy: (1) θa ∈ [a0, a1], θ˜a ∈ [a0, a1], θ˜b ∈ [b0, b1]; (2) θa ∈ [a1, a0], θ˜a ∈ [a0, a1], θ˜b ∈ [b1, b0]; (3) θa ∈ [a1, a0],
θ˜a ∈ [a1, a0], θ˜b ∈ [b0, b1]
Lemma 8. Let A =
g1b
b1−b1
− g
0
b
b0−b0
g0
b
b0−b0
+
g1
b
b1−b1
and B =
g1a
a1−a1+
g0a
a0−a0
g0a
a0−a0−
g1a
a1−a1
, then the StatPar greedy fair decision maker at each time
t selects parameter pair (θa(t), θb(t)) based on
αa(t)
αb(t)
, and A, B according to the following:
For the case when θb ∈ [b0, b1], θa ∈ [a0, a1], θ˜a ∈ [a0, a1], θ˜b ∈ [b0, b1].
If g
1
b
b1−b1
>
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 <
g0a
a0−a0 , then 0 < A < 1 < B and (θa(t), θb(t)) =

(θ˜a, b1), if
αa(t)
αb(t)
< A
(θa, b0), if A <
αa(t)
αb(t)
< 1
(a1, θ˜b), if 1 <
αa(t)
αb(t)
< B
(a0, θb), if
αa(t)
αb(t)
> B
If g
1
b
b1−b1
>
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 >
g0a
a0−a0 , then B < 0 < A < 1 and (θa(t), θb(t)) =

(θ˜a, b1), if
αa(t)
αb(t)
< A
(θa, b0), if A <
αa(t)
αb(t)
< 1
(a1, θ˜b), if
αa(t)
αb(t)
> 1
If g
1
b
b1−b1
<
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 <
g0a
a0−a0 , then A < 0 < 1 < B and (θa(t), θb(t)) =

(θa, b0), if
αa(t)
αb(t)
< 1
(a1, θ˜b), if 1 <
αa(t)
αb(t)
< B
(a0, θb), if
αa(t)
αb(t)
> B
If g
1
b
b1−b1
<
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 >
g0a
a0−a0 then A < 0, B < 0 and (θa(t), θb(t)) =
{
(θa, b0), if
αa(t)
αb(t)
< 1
(a1, θ˜b), if
αa(t)
αb(t)
> 1
The conclusions for the other two cases are similar.
Proof. When θb ∈ [b0, b1], θa ∈ [a0, a1], θ˜a ∈ [a0, a1], θ˜b ∈ [b0, b1]. There are 3 possibilities for an optimal (θa, θb)
pair:
(1) θa ∈ [a1, a0], θb ∈ [θ˜b, θb]
Lt(θa, θb) = ((1 +
αb(t)
αa(t)
)
α1a(t)
a1−a1 − (1−
αb(t)
αa(t)
)
α0a(t)
a0−a0 )θa + α
1
b(t)− α
1
a(t)
a1−a1 (a1 + a1
αb(t)
αa(t)
) +
α0a(t)
a0−a0 (a0 − a0
αb(t)
αa(t)
)
(θa(t), θb(t)) =
(a1, θ˜b), if (αa(t) + αb(t))
α1a(t)
a1−a1 > (αa(t)− αb(t))
α0a(t)
a0−a0
(a0, θb), if (αa(t) + αb(t))
α1a(t)
a1−a1 < (αa(t)− αb(t))
α0a(t)
a0−a0
(2) θa ∈ [θa, a1], θb ∈ [b0, θ˜b]
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Lt(θa, θb) =
α0a(t)
a0−a0 (
αb(t)
αa(t)
− 1)θa + α1b(t) + α
0
a(t)
a0−a0 (a0 − a0
αb(t)
αa(t)
)− α1a αb(t)αa(t)
(θa(t), θb(t)) =
{
(θa, b0), if αa(t) > αb(t)
(a1, θ˜b), if αa(t) < αb(t)
(3) θa ∈ [θ˜a, θa], θb ∈ [b1, b0]
Lt(θa, θb) = ((1− αb(t)αa(t) )
α1b(t)
b1−b1
− (1 + αb(t)αa(t) )
α0b(t)
b0−b0
)θb − α1a(t)− α
1
b(t)
b1−b1
(b1 − b1 αb(t)αa(t) ) +
α0b(t)
b0−b0
(b0 + b0
αb(t)
αa(t)
)
(θa(t), θb(t)) =
(θ˜a, b1), if (αb(t)− αa(t))
α1b(t)
b1−b1
> (αa(t) + αb(t))
α0b(t)
b0−b0
(θa, b0), if (αb(t)− αa(t)) α
1
b(t)
b1−b1
< (αa(t) + αb(t))
α0b(t)
b0−b0
Therefore, replacing αjk(t) as αk(t)g
j
k for k ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {0, 1}. combining and re-organizing the above conditions
implies:
(θta, θ
t
b) =

(θ˜a, b1), if (αb(t)− αa(t)) g
1
b
b1−b1
> (αa(t) + αb(t))
g0b
b0−b0
(a0, θb), if (αa(t) + αb(t))
g1a
a1−a1 < (αa(t)− αb(t))
g0a
a0−a0
(θa, b0), if (αb(t)− αa(t)) g
1
b
b1−b1
< (αa(t) + αb(t))
g0b
b0−b0
& αa(t) < αb(t)
(a1, θ˜b), if (αa(t) + αb(t))
g1a
a1−a1 > (αa(t)− αb(t))
g0a
a0−a0 & αa(t) > αb(t)
Substitute with A, B gives Lemma 8.
I Proof of Theorem 5
Lemma 9. For the Simple, EqOpt and StatPar greedy fair decision as given in (3), {ν(La(θma ))}Mm=1 is monotonic
increasing in m and {ν(Lb(θmb ))}Mm=1 is monotomic decreasing in m.
Proof. It is proved by showing each case separately.
• Simple greedy fair decision
a1 :
La(a1) = g
0
a
a0−a1
a0−a0
Lb(a1) = g
0
b
b0−a1
b0−b0
b0 :
La(b0) = g
1
a
b0−a1
a1−a1
Lb(b0) = g
1
b
b0−b1
b1−b1
b1 :
La(b1) = g
1
a
b1−a1
a1−a1 + g
0
a
a0−b1
a0−a0
Lb(b1) = g
0
b
b0−b1
b0−b0
a0 :
{
La(a0) = g
1
a
a0−a1
a1−a1
Lb(a0) = g
1
b
a0−b1
b1−b1
+ g0b
b0−a0
b0−b0
Re-organize it gives: La(b0) − La(a0) = g1a b0−a0a1−a1 > 0, La(a0) − La(b1) = (a0 − b1)(
g1a
a1−a1 −
g0a
a0−a0 ), La(b1) −
La(a1) = (b1−a1)( g
1
a
a1−a1 −
g0a
a0−a0 ), Lb(a1)−Lb(b1) = g
0
b
b1−a1
b0−b0
> 0, Lb(b1)−Lb(a0) = (a0−b1)( g
0
b
b0−b0
− g1b
b1−b1
),
Lb(a0)− Lb(b0) = (b0 − a0)( g
0
b
b0−b0
− g1b
b1−b1
)
If g
1
b
b1−b1
<
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 >
g0a
a0−a0 , then La(b0) > La(a0) > La(b1) > La(a1) and Lb(a1) > Lb(b1) > Lb(a0) >
Lb(b0).
If g
1
b
b1−b1
>
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 >
g0a
a0−a0 , then La(b1) > La(a1) and Lb(a1) > Lb(b1).
If g
1
b
b1−b1
<
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 <
g0a
a0−a0 , then La(b0) > La(a0) and Lb(a0) > Lb(b0).
If g
1
b
b1−b1
>
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 <
g0a
a0−a0 , then La(a0) < La(b1) and Lb(b1) < Lb(a0).
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• EqOpt greedy fair decision
(a1, θb) :
{
La(a1) = g
0
a
a0−a1
a0−a0
Lb(θb) = g
0
b
a0−a1
a0−a0
(θa, b1) :
La(θa) = g
0
a
b0−b1
b0−b0
+ g1a
θa−a1
a1−a1
Lb(b1) = g
0
b
b0−b1
b0−b0
(a0, b0) :
La(a0) = g
1
a
a0−a1
a1−a1
Lb(b0) = g
1
b
b0−b1
b1−b1
Re-organize it gives: La(θa)−La(a0) = b0−b1b0−b0 (g
0
a−g1a a0−a0a1−a1 ), La(θa)−La(a1) = (g
0
a−g1a a0−a0a1−a1 )(
b0−b1
b0−b0
− a0−a1a0−a0 ),
Lb(θb)− Lb(b1) = g0b (a0−a1a0−a0 −
b0−b1
b0−b0
), Lb(b1)− Lb(b0) = (b0 − b1)( g
0
b
b0−b0
− g1b
b1−b1
)
Notice that we have assumed that b0−b1
b0−b0
<
a0−a1
a0−a0 .
If g
1
a
a1−a1 >
g0a
a0−a0 , then La(a1) < La(θa) < La(a0).
If g
1
a
a1−a1 <
g0a
a0−a0 , then La(θa) > La(a0).
Furthermore, In order to take (a0, b0), A >
ηa(t)
ηb(t)
> 0 should be satisfied. Therefore, if g
1
a
a1−a1 >
g0a
a0−a0 , then
g0b
b0−b0
− g1b
b1−b1
> 0 should hold and Lb(θb) > Lb(b1) > Lb(b0).
if g
1
a
a1−a1 <
g0a
a0−a0 , then
g0b
b0−b0
− g1b
b1−b1
< 0 should hold and Lb(b1) < Lb(b0).
• StatPar greedy fair decision When θb ∈ [b0, b1], θa < a0, θa ∈ [a0, a1], θ˜a ∈ [a0, a1], θ˜b ∈ [b0, b1].
(θ˜a, b1) :
La(θ˜a) = g
0
b
b0−b1
b0−b0
+ g1b − g1a
Lb(b1) = g
0
b
b0−b1
b0−b0
(a0, θb) :
{
La(a0) = g
1
a
a0−a1
a1−a1
Lb(θb) = g
1
b − g1a a1−a0a1−a1
(θa, b0) :
La(θa) = g
1
b
b1−b0
b1−b1
− g1a
Lb(b0) = g
1
b
b0−b1
b1−b1
(a1, θ˜b) :
{
La(a1) = g
0
a
a0−a1
a0−a0
Lb(θ˜b) = g
1
b − g1a − g0a a0−a1a0−a0
Re-organize it gives: La(θ˜a)−La(θa) = g0b b0−b1b0−b0 + g
1
b
b0−b1
b1−b1
> 0, La(θa)−La(a1) = g1b b1−b0b1−b1 − g
1
a− g0a a0−a1a0−a0 > 0,
La(a1) − La(a0) = (a0 − a1)( g
0
a
a0−a0 −
g1a
a1−a1 ), Lb(b0) − Lb(b1) = (b0 − b1)(
g1b
b1−b1
− g0b
b0−b0
), Lb(θ˜b) − Lb(b0) =
g1b
b1−b0
b1−b1
− g1a − g0a a0−a1a0−a0 > 0, Lb(θb)− Lb(θ˜b) = g
0
a
a0−a1
a0−a0 + g
1
a
a0−a1
a1−a1 > 0
If g
1
b
b1−b1
>
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 <
g0a
a0−a0 , then La(θ˜a) > La(θa) > La(a1) > La(a0) and Lb(θb) > Lb(θ˜b) > Lb(b0) >
Lb(b1).
If g
1
b
b1−b1
>
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 >
g0a
a0−a0 , then La(θ˜a) > La(θa) > La(a1) and Lb(θ˜b) > Lb(b0) > Lb(b1).
If g
1
b
b1−b1
<
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 <
g0a
a0−a0 , then La(θa) > La(a1) > La(a0) and Lb(θb) > Lb(θ˜b) > Lb(b0).
If g
1
b
b1−b1
<
g0b
b0−b0
& g
1
a
a1−a1 >
g0a
a0−a0 , then La(θa) > La(a1) and Lb(θ˜b) > Lb(b0).
Since ν(·) is a strictly decreasing function, Lemma 9 is proved.
Lemma 10. Suppose the greedy fair decision (θa(t), θb(t)) at round t follows (3), in which {ν(La(θma ))}Mm=1
is monotonic increasing in m and {ν(Lb(θmb ))}Mm=1 is monotonic decreasing in m. Let Ii ={m|(θma , θmb ) is the i-th visited decision by decision maker} and Nk(1) be the population of Gk at the first round.
If Nk(2) > Nk(1), k ∈ {a, b}, then the following holds for each visited decision (θIia , θIib ), i = 1, 2, · · ·
(1) If rIi >
Na(1)
Nb(1)
, then ∃ only two possibilities for greedy decision:
• If βa(1−ν(Lb(θ
Ii
b )))
βb(1−ν(La(θIia )))
< rIi , then greedy decision will be (θ
Ii
a , θ
Ii
b ), ∀t
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• If βa(1−ν(Lb(θ
Ii
b )))
βb(1−ν(La(θIia )))
> rIi , then greedy decision will change from (θ
Ii
a , θ
Ii
b ) to (θ
Ii+1
a , θ
Ii+1
b ) at some t0, i.e.,
Ii+1 = Ii + 1. Moreover, Na(t0) < βa
1−ν(La(θIi+1a ))
holds.
(2) If rIi−1 <
Na(1)
Nb(1)
, then ∃ only two possibilities for greedy decision:
• If βa(1−ν(Lb(θ
Ii
b )))
βb(1−ν(La(θIia )))
> rIi−1, then greedy decision will be (θ
Ii
a , θ
Ii
b ), ∀t
• If βa(1−ν(Lb(θ
Ii
b )))
βb(1−ν(La(θIia )))
< rIi−1, then greedy decision will change from (θ
Ii
a , θ
Ii
b ) to (θ
Ii−1
a , θ
Ii−1
b ) at some t0, i.e.,
Ii+1 = Ii − 1. Moreover, Nb(t0) < βb
1−ν(Lb(θIi+1b ))
holds.
Proof. We denote rM = +∞ and r0 = 0 in the following analysis. Let Nk(1) be the population of Gk at the first
round, then according to dynamic model,Nk(t+1) = βk(1+
∑t−1
j=1
∏t−1
i=j ν(Lk(θk(i))))+Nk(1)
∏t
i=0 ν(Lk(θk(i))),
∀t ≥ 1. To simplify the notations, denote νmk = ν(Lk(θmk )) for k ∈ {a, b} and m = 1, · · · ,M .
Prove Lemma 10 by induction.
Base case: For the first visited decision, assume I1 = j, i.e., (θa(1), θb(1)) = (θja, θ
j
b), then
Na(1)
Nb(1)
∈ (rj−1, rj). For
t ≥ 1, Nk(t) = (νjk)t−1Nk(1) + βk
∑t−2
s=0(ν
j
k)
s and Na(t)Nb(t) =
(νja)
t−1Na(1)+βa
∑t−2
s=0(ν
j
a)
s
(νjb )
t−1Nb(1)+βb
∑t−2
s=0(ν
j
b )
s
.
(1) If νja > ν
j
b . Since Na(2) > Na(1) → Na(1) < βa1−νja and
βbNa(1)
βaNb(1)
< rj
βb
βa
, according to Lemma 5: (i) If
βa(1−νjb )
βb(1−νja) < rj , then
Na(t)
Nb(t)
∈ (rj−1, rj) and (θa(t), θb(t)) = (θja, θjb), ∀t. greedy decision will stay at (θja, θjb). (ii) If
βa(1−νjb )
βb(1−νja) > rj , then ∃t0 such that
Na(t0)
Nb(t0)
> rj and greedy decision starts to change to (θj+1a , θ
j+1
b ), i.e., I2 = I1 + 1.
Moreover,Na(t0) = (νja)
t0−1Na(1) + βa
∑t0−2
s=0 (ν
j
a)
s < βa
1−νja <
βa
1−νj+1a =
βa
1−νI2a
, where the second inequality is
because νj+1a > ν
j
a.
(2) If νja < ν
j
b . Since Nb(2) > Nb(1) → Nb(1) < βb1−νjb and
βbNa(1)
βaNb(1)
> rj−1 βbβa , according to Lemma 5: (i) If
βa(1−νjb )
βb(1−νja) > rj−1, then
Na(t)
Nb(t)
∈ (rj−1, rj) and (θa(t), θb(t)) = (θja, θjb), ∀t. greedy decision will stay at (θja, θjb).
(ii) If βa(1−ν
j
b )
βb(1−νja) < rj−1, then ∃t0 such that
Na(t0)
Nb(t0)
< rj−1 and greedy decision starts to change to (θj−1a , θ
j−1
b ), i.e.,
I2 = I1 − 1. Moreover,Nb(t0) = (νjb )t0−1Nb(1) + βb
∑t0−2
s=0 (ν
j
b )
s < βb
1−νjb
< βb
1−νj−1b
= βb
1−νI2b
, where the second
inequality is because νj−1b > ν
j
b .
Induction Step: Suppose Lemma 10 is true for i-th visited decision (i > 1), let Ii = m. Then for the (i + 1)-th
visited decision that is visited at t0, there could be two possibilities:
(1) Ii+1 = Ii + 1 = m+ 1, where
βa(1−νmb )
βb(1−νma ) > rm and Na(t0) <
βa
1−νm+1a and rm <
Na(t0)
Nb(t0)
< rm+1 hold.
For t > t0, Nk(t) = βk
∑t−t0−1
s=0 (ν
m+1
k )
s + (νm+1k )
t−t0Nk(t0) Since νm+1a > ν
m
a > ν
m
b > ν
m+1
b ,
Na(t0)
Nb(t0)
<
rm+1 and Na(t0) < βa1−νm+1a hold. By Lemma 5, (i) If
βa(1−νm+1b )
βb(1−νm+1a ) < rm+1, then
Na(t)
Na(t)
< rm+1 holds ∀t ≥ t0.
greedy decision will stay at (θm+1a , θ
m+1
b ). (ii) if
βa(1−νm+1b )
βb(1−νm+1a ) > rm+1, then ∃t1 such that
Na(t1)
Nb(t1)
> rm+1 and
greedy decision starts to change to (θm+2a , θ
m+2
b ), i.e., Ii+2 = Ii+1 + 1. Moreover, Na(t1) =
∑t1−t0−1
s=0 (ν
m+1
a )
s +
(νm+1a )
t1−t0Na(t0) < βa1−νm+1a <
βa
1−νm+2a =
βa
1−νIi+2a
.
(2) Ii+1 = Ii − 1 = m− 1, where βa(1−ν
m
b )
βb(1−νma ) < rm−1 and Nb(t0) <
βb
1−νm−1a and rm−1 <
Na(t0)
Nb(t0)
< rm hold.
For t > t0, Nk(t) = βk
∑t−t0−1
s=0 (ν
m−1
k )
s + (νm−1k )
t−t0Nk(t0) Since νm−1a < ν
m
a < ν
m
b < ν
m−1
b ,
Na(t0)
Nb(t0)
>
rm−1 and Nb(t0) < βb1−νm−1b
hold. By Lemma 5, (i) If βa(1−ν
m+1
b )
βb(1−νm+1a ) > rm−1, then
Na(t)
Na(t)
> rm−1 holds ∀t ≥ t0.
greedy decision will stay at (θm−1a , θ
m−1
b ). (ii) if
βa(1−νm−1b )
βb(1−νm−1a ) < rm−1, then ∃t1 such that
Na(t1)
Nb(t1)
< rm−1 and
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greedy decision starts to change to (θm−2a , θ
m−2
b ), i.e., Ii+2 = Ii+1 − 1. Moreover, Nb(t1) =
∑t1−t0−1
s=0 (ν
m−1
a )
s +
(νm−1a )
t1−t0Nb(t0) < βb1−νm−1b
< βb
1−νm−2b
= βb
1−νIi+2b
.
Therefore, Lemma 10 also holds for (i+ 1)-th visited decision, and the proof of the induction step is complete.
Then Theorem 5 can be concluded from Lemma 10 and the fact that there are only finite number of actions
{(θma , θmb )}Mm=1 directly.
J Algorithm to find visited decisions for uniform case
Lemma 10 also provides a simple method for finding the visited decision list {(θIia , θIib )}Ki=1, the complete procedure is
given in Algorithm 1. Input {(θma , θmb ), rm}Mm=1 fully describe one-shot decisions at each time step, and 1−ν(Lk(θmk )),
k ∈ {a, b} is the fraction of users from group Gk that leave the system if taking decision θmk .
Algorithm 1 Finding the visited decisions list
Input: {(θma , θmb ), rm, βa(1−ν(Lb(θ
m
b )))
βb(1−ν(La(θma )))}
M
m=1
Output: {(θIia , θIib )}Ki=1
k = {m|Na(1)Nb(1) ∈ (rm−1, rm)};
i = 1;
while true do
(θIia , θ
Ii
b ) = (θ
k
a , θ
k
b );
if βa(1−ν(Lb(θ
k
b )))
βb(1−ν(La(θka))) ∈ (rk−1, rk) then
break;
else if βa(1−ν(Lb(θ
k
b )))
βb(1−ν(La(θka))) < rk−1 then
k ← k − 1;
else if βa(1−ν(Lb(θ
k
b )))
βb(1−ν(La(θka))) > rk then
k ← k + 1;
end if
i = i+ 1;
end while
return {(θIia , θIib )}Ki=1
K Experiments Supplementary
K.1 Parameter settings
For the truncated normal case, the supports of f jk(x), k ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {0, 1} are [a0, a1, a0, a1] = [−8, 5, 19, 35],
[b0, b1, b0, b1] = [−6, 25, 9, 43], with the means [µ0a, µ1a, µ0b , µ1b ] = [4, 20, 8, 27] and standard deviations
[σ0a, σ
1
a, σ
0
b , σ
1
b ] = [5, 6, 3, 6]. The label proportions are g
0
a = 0.4, g
0
b = 0.6. The dynamics (1) uses ν(x) = 1− x
For the uniform case, the supports of f jk(x), k ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {0, 1} are [a0, a1, a0, a1] = [−5, 10, 20, 35],
[b0, b1, b0, b1] = [3, 17, 25, 45]. The label proportions are g
0
a = 0.8, g
0
b = 0.2. The dynamics (1) uses ν(x) = 1− x2
K.2 Results on uniformly distributed case
Simple fair StatPar fair EqOpt fair
βa = 3000;βb = 7000 [(17, 17)] [(−1.02, 17)] [(10.91, 17)]
βa = 7000;βb = 3000 [(20, 20)] [(20, 40.80)] [(20, 25)]
βa = 5000;βb = 5000 [(20, 20)] [(10, 26.8), (8.39, 25), (−1.02, 17)] [(20, 25)]
Table 1: Visited decisions {(θIia , θIib )}Ki=1
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Figure 9: Sample paths for a scenario with uniform feature distributions and βa + βb = 10000. Table. 1 illustrates all
the visited decisions {(θIia , θIib )}Ki=1 under different fairness criteria, the corresponding αa(t) and the average total loss
at each time step t are shown in Figure 9(a)9(b) respectively: the solid lines are for the case when βa = βb, dashed
lines are for 3βa = 7βb, dot dashed lines are for 7βa = 3βb. Notice that the EqLos greedy fair decision can achieve the
lowest averaged total loss in this example.
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Figure 10: Each dot in Figure 10(a)-10(d) represents the final group proportion limt→∞ αa(t) of one sample path under
a pair of arriving rates (βa, βb). By comparing this figure with Figure. 5, we notice that group representation is more
unstable under uniform distribution (small variation in arrival rate can change the group representation significantly) as
compared to an example with truncated normal feature distribution.
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K.3 Feature distributions affect the preference
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Figure 11: Change f0b (x) by varying σ
0
b ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. As σ0b increases, the overlap area with f1b (x) also
increases as shown in Figure. 11(a). Figure. 11(b) shows the result under StatPar fairness. Given θa(t), the larger σ0b
results in the larger Lb(θb(t)) and further the larger Ga’s proportion.
K.4 Representation disparity under βa, βb
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Figure 12: Each dot in Figure 12(e)-12(h) represents the final group representation disparity
min{limt→∞ αa(t), limt→∞ αb(t)} of one sample path under a pair of arriving rates (βa, βb). The darker color
illustrates higher representation disparity.
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